Majority
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants Chris A. Amar and R & C Delivery Services Corp. ap
Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order as granted that branch of the motion of the defendant Stephanie A. Ryan which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her and from so much of the judgment as dismissed the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant Stephanie A. Ryan is dismissed, as the defendants Chris A. Amar and R & C Delivery Services Corp. are not aggrieved by those portions of the order and the judgment (see CPLR 5511; Mixon v TBV, Inc., 76 AD3d 144 , 156 [2010]); and it is further,
Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order as granted that branch of the motion of the defendant Stephanie A. Ryan which was for summary judgment dismissing the cross claim of the defendants Chris A. Amar and R & C Delivery Services Corp. asserted against her is dismissed; and it is further,
Ordered that the appeal from so much of the judgment as dismissed the complaint is dismissed, as the defendants Chris A. Amar and R & C Delivery Services Corp. are not aggrieved by that portion of the judgment (see CPLR 5511; Mixon v TBV, Inc., 76 AD3d 144 , 156 [2010]); and it is further;
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the plaintiff and the defendant Stephanie A. Ryan.
The appeal from so much of the order as granted that branch of the motion of the defendant Stephanie A. Ryan which was for summary judgment dismissing the cross claim asserted against her must be dismissed, because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment (see Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241 , 248 [1976]). The issues raised on the appeal from that portion of the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from so much of the judgment as is in favor of Stephanie A. Ryan dismissing the cross claim asserted against her (see CPLR 5501 [a] [1]).
“In a chain collision accident, the operator of the middle vehicle may establish prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the middle vehicle was properly stopped behind the lead vehicle when it was struck from behind by the rear vehicle and propelled into the lead vehicle” (Chuk Hwa Shin v Correale, 142 AD3d 518 , 519 [2016]; see Niosi v Jones, 133 AD3d 578 , 580 [2015]; Fontehoa v Nugget Cab Corp., 123 AD3d 759 , 760 [2014]; Kuris v El Sol Contr. & Constr. Corp., 116 AD3d 675 , 676 [2014]). Here, Ryan established her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cross claim asserted against her by the appellants by submitting evidence that, prior to striking the rear of the plaintiff’s vehicle, which had been stopped due to traffic, she had been stopped behind the plaintiff’s vehicle and was propelled into the plaintiff’s vehicle after her vehicle was struck in the rear by the appellants’ vehicle (see Chuk Hwa Shin v Correale, 142 AD3d at 519 ; Niosi v Jones, 133 AD3d at 580 ; Fontehoa v Nugget Cab Corp., 123 AD3d at 760 ). In opposition, the appellants failed to raise a triable issue of fact. The appellants proffered only their attorney’s affirmation, which, standing alone, was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see CPLR 3212 [b]; Gallo v Jairath, 122 AD3d 795 , 797 [2014]).
The appellants’ contention that the motions should have been denied as premature pursuant to CPLR 3212 (f) is without merit. A party who contends that a summary judgment motion is premature is required to demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant (see CPLR 3212 [f]; Suero-Sosa v Cardona, 112 AD3d 706 , 708 [2013]; Cajas-Romero v Ward, 106 AD3d 850 , 852 [2013]; Woodard v Thomas, 77 AD3d 738 , 740 [2010]). Here, the appellants, who relied solely on their attorney’s affirmation, failed to set forth either basis, and the “mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is an insufficient basis for denying the motion” (Suero-Sosa v Cardona, 112 AD3d at 708 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Williams v Spencer-Hall, 113 AD3d 759 , 760-761 [2014]; Westport Ins. Co. v Altertec Energy Conservation, LLC, 82 AD3d 1207 , 1212 [2011]).
The appellants’ remaining contentions are without merit.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of Ryan’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cross claim against her and properly granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the issue on the liability insofar as asserted against the appellants.
Balkin, J.P., Austin, Sgroi and LaSalle, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- In re Aho 39 NY2d 241 at 248 p. 1001
- Chuk Hwa Shin v. Correale 142 AD3d 518 at 519 p. 1002
- Niosi v. Jones 133 AD3d 578 at 580 p. 1002
- Fonteboa v. Nugget Cab Corp. 123 AD3d 759 at 760 p. 1002
- Kuris v. El Sol Contracting & Construction Corp. 116 AD3d 675 at 676 p. 1002
- Gallo v. Jairath 122 AD3d 795 at 797 p. 1002
- Adams v. Bruno 124 AD3d 566 at 567 p. 1003
- De Castillo v. Sormeley 140 AD3d 918 at 920 p. 1003
- Suero-Sosa v. Cardona 112 AD3d 706 at 708 p. 1003
- Cajas-Romero v. Ward 106 AD3d 850 at 852 p. 1003
- Woodard v. Thomas 77 AD3d 738 at 740 p. 1003
- Williams v. Spencer-Hall 113 AD3d 759 at 760-761 p. 1003
- Westport Insurance v. Altertec Energy Conservation, LLC 82 AD3d 1207 at 1212 p. 1003