Majority
Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (James H. Cecile, A.J.), rendered March 25, 2014. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of burglary in the third degree.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of burglary in the third degree (Penal Law § 140.20). Preliminarily, we agree with defendant that he did not validly waive his right to appeal because, although defendant signed two written waivers of the right to appeal, there was no colloquy between County Court and defendant concerning the waiver (see People v Bradshaw, 18 NY3d 257 , 264-265 [2011]; People v Callahan, 80 NY2d 273 ,
Although defendant was not required to preserve for our review his challenge to the validity of his waiver of indictment (see People v Boston, 75 NY2d 585 , 589 n [1990]; People v Lugg, 108 AD3d 1074 , 1074 [2013]), we reject defendant’s contentions that his waiver of indictment is invalid because there was no colloquy on that subject and no evidence in the record that his waiver was executed in “open court” (CPL 195.20). A colloquy is not required in connection with a waiver of indictment (see generally People v Pierce, 14 NY3d 564 , 567-568 [2010]) and, “even [when] the plea minutes are silent,” the “open court” execution requirement of CPL 195.20 is satisfied where, as here, the court’s order approving the indictment waiver “expressly found that defendant had executed the waiver in open court” (People v Davis, 84 AD3d 1645 , 1646 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 815 [2011]; see People v Finster, 136 AD3d 1279 , 1280 [2016], lv denied 27 NY3d 1132 [2016]).
We reject defendant’s contention that the court abused its discretion in terminating his participation in a drug treatment program. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, defendant was placed in a drug treatment program and, following his successful completion of the program, the charge would be reduced to an unspecified misdemeanor, from which he would be conditionally discharged. If defendant did not complete the program, however, defendant could receive any lawful sentence on the burglary conviction, including the maximum term of imprisonment. When defendant did not successfully complete the program, the court sentenced him to the maximum term allowed. Trial courts have “broad discretion when supervising a defendant subject to [a drug treatment program], and deciding whether the conditions of a [drug treatment program] plea agreement have been met” (People v Fiammegta, 14 NY3d 90 , 96 [2010]; see generally CPL 216.05 [9] [c]). Here, despite doing well in the first year of the program, defendant ultimately relapsed multiple times and missed several court dates. De
Finally, defendant’s sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.
Present—Smith, J.P., Lindley, DeJoseph, NeMoyer and Trout-man, JJ.
Cases cited
- People v. Bradshaw 18 NY3d 257 at 264-265 p. 1596
- People v. Callahan 80 NY2d 273 p. 1596
- People v. Terry 138 AD3d 1484 at 1484 p. 1597
- People v. Reinard 134 AD3d 1407 at 1408 p. 1597
- People v. Boston 75 NY2d 585 at 589 p. 1597
- People v. Lugg 108 AD3d 1074 at 1074 p. 1597
- People v. Pierce 14 NY3d 564 at 567-568 p. 1597
- People v. Davis 84 AD3d 1645 at 1646 p. 1597
- People v. Finster 136 AD3d 1279 at 1280 p. 1597
- People v. Fiammegta 14 NY3d 90 at 96 p. 1597
- People v. Shipp 138 AD3d 1416 at 1417 p. 1598
- People v. Peck 100 AD3d 1520 at 1521 p. 1598