Majority
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Manuel J. Mendez, J.), entered October 6, 2015, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs.
Meanwhile, B&P entered into an asset purchase agreement (the APA) with defendants for the sale of the goodwill of its pharmacy business. The APA closed on November 20, 2013, on which date B&P posted a notice on its premises advising its customers that the pharmacy was closed, and directing them to fill their prescriptions at defendants’ nearby competing pharmacy. The APA had a noncompete provision—under which B&P would forfeit half of the compensation due thereunder if a pharmacy was operated at the premises prior to November 20, 2014—which strongly motivated B&P to remain on the premises, in order to prevent plaintiff from leasing the premises to another pharmacy. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, triable issues of fact exist as to the first four elements of a cause of action for tortious interference with contract, namely the existence of a valid contract, defendants’ knowledge of the contract, defendants’ intentional procurement of a breach of the contract, and breach of the contract (see Lama Holding Co. v Smith Barney, 88 NY2d 413 , 424 [1996]; Snyder v Sony Music Entertainment, 252 AD2d 294 , 299 [1st Dept 1999]).
Plaintiff has, however, failed to raise triable issues of fact as to the last element of damages. Plaintiff seeks damages only for the period of December 1, 2013, through the end of B&P’s holdover on September 24, 2014, in the form of lost rent from a viable pharmacy during the holdover period. It is impossible for plaintiff to incur such damages during this period, because B&P, while unlawfully holding over, was not in breach of the lease’s pharmacy provision, which expired on November 30, 2013. In other words, any losses suffered by plaintiff during this period were not occasioned by defendants’ inducement of B&P to breach the lease’s restricted premises provision,
The motion court properly dismissed plaintiff’s negligence claim, since plaintiff has not “posit[ed] any source of duty” owed to it by any of the defendants upon which to premise a negligence claim (Regini v Board of Mgrs. of Loft Space Condominium, 107 AD3d 496 , 497 [1st Dept 2013]; see Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136 , 138 [2002]).
Concur— Tom, J.P., Acosta, Andrias, Moskowitz and Kahn, JJ.
Cases cited
- City of New York v. Pennsylvania Railroad 37 NY2d 298 at 300 p. 445
- JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Rocar Realty Northeast, Inc. 47 AD3d 425 at 427 p. 445
- People v. Middleton 11 NY3d 761 p. 445
- Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney Inc. 88 NY2d 413 at 424 p. 445
- Snyder v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc. 252 AD2d 294 at 299 p. 445
- Regini v. Board of Managers of Loft Space Condominium 107 AD3d 496 at 497 p. 446
- Espinal v. Melville Snow Contractors, Inc. 98 NY2d 136 at 138 p. 446