Majority
The determination that respondent’s actions did not rise to the family offense of either disorderly conduct or harassment in the second degree is supported by a fair preponderance of the evidence (see Matter of Everett C. v Oneida P., 61 AD3d 489 [1st Dept 2009]; Penal Law §§ 240.20, 240.26 [3]). The offense of disorderly conduct was necessarily dismissed since none of the acts alleged occurred in public, were intended to cause a public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly created such a risk (see Matter of Janice M. v Terrance J., 96 AD3d 482 [1st Dept 2012]).
As for the offense of harassment in the second degree, petitioner failed to adduce evidence that would support a finding that respondent engaged in a course of conduct or repeatedly committed acts which alarmed or seriously annoyed petitioner, and which served no legitimate purpose (Penal Law § 240.26 [3]). Petitioner’s testimony that respondent had banged on the door because he was locked out did not establish conduct that served no legitimate purpose (see generally Matter of Marquardt v Marquardt, 97 AD3d 1112 [4th Dept 2012]). Nor did respondent’s use of foul and disparaging language to petitioner, although immature and inappropriate, rise to the level of harassment (see Matter of Lewis v Robinson, 41 AD3d 996 [3d Dept 2007]; see also Matter of Christina MM. v George MM., 103 AD3d 935 [3d Dept 2013]). Issues of credibility were properly resolved by the fact-finder (see Matter of F.B. v W.B., 248 AD2d 119 [1st Dept 1998]).
Concur—Tom, J.P., Friedman, Saxe, Feinman and Kahn, JJ.
Cases cited
- Janice M. v. Terrance J. 96 AD3d 482 p. 528
- Marquardt v. Marquardt 97 AD3d 1112 p. 528
- Lewis v. Robinson 41 AD3d 996 p. 528