Majority
Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Broome County (Young, J.), entered January 7, 2016, which granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 10, to adjudicate the subject child to be neglected.
Respondent Samantha LL. (hereinafter respondent) is the mother of the subject child (born in 2013). Weekday mornings, respondent generally dropped the child off with the child’s paternal grandparents, who watched the child from 10:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. while respondent was at work. Respondent would pick up the child later in the evening. One morning in July 2014, after the child was left with the grandparents, the grandmother took the child to the hospital where it was revealed that the child had sustained a skull fracture and had multiple bruises and abrasions throughout his body. Petitioner subsequently commenced this Family Ct Act article 10 proceeding alleging that respondent, among others, neglected the child. Following a fact-finding hearing, Family Court adjudicated the child to be neglected. Respondent appeals. We affirm.
In a neglect proceeding, petitioner bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the child’s physical, mental or emotional condition was harmed or imminently in danger of such harm due to a parent’s failure to exercise a minimum degree of care (see Family Ct Act §§ 1012 [f] [i]; 1046 [b] [i]; Matter of Stephanie RR. [Sullivan County Dept. of Social Servs. —Pedro RR.], 140 AD3d 1237 , 1238 [2016]; Matter of Daniel X. [Monica X.], 114 AD3d 1059 , 1060 [2014]). To establish a prima facie case of neglect, petitioner must demonstrate that “the child in question sustained the type of injury that ordinarily would not occur absent an act or omission by the parent or person otherwise legally responsible for his or her care and, further, that such individual was the caretaker of the child at the time the underlying injury oc
We conclude that petitioner made a prima facie showing that respondent neglected the child. The grandparents watched the child on July 10, 2014 and they found nothing abnormal about the child. When changing the child’s clothes or diapers, the paternal grandmother did not see any bruises, rashes or abrasions. That evening when the grandmother dropped the child off with respondent, she informed respondent that the child had a long day and was tired. The next morning, during the exchange of the child, respondent told the grandmother that the child had a rash, which respondent believed was caused by the child’s pajamas. The grandmother, however, testified that the child’s behavior, while not alarming, was unusual. The child was fussy, quiet and had no appetite. When the grandmother tried to change the child’s clothes and diapers, the child did not want to lie on his back and appeared to be in pain, and the grandmother noticed bruises on the child’s chest, leg, shoulder and head. At approximately 1:00 p.m., the grandmother took the child to a hospital where the child was diagnosed with a skull fracture and numerous bruises throughout his body. A physician who testified on petitioner’s behalf opined that the child’s injuries were caused by nonaccidental means and likely occurred 15 to 18 hours prior to the child’s hospital admission. While respondent argues that the physician’s opinion should have been disregarded because the physician did not personally examine the child, the failure to do so, while not insignificant, does not render the physician’s opinion without any probative value (see Matter of April WW. [Kimberly WW.], 133 AD3d 1113 , 1118 [2015]). Rather, it goes to the weight to be accorded to such opinion. Furthermore, respondent waived any challenge to the physician’s credentials inasmuch as she never objected to Family Court’s qualification of the physician as an expert (see Matter of Kaitlyn R., 267 AD2d 894 , 896 [1999]). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that petitioner adduced prima facie evidence of neglect (see Matter of Ameillia RR. [Megan SS. —Jered RR.], 112 AD3d 1083 , 1084 [2013]; Matter of Seamus K., 33 AD3d 1030 , 1032 [2006]).
In response to petitioner’s prima facie showing, respondent
McCarthy, J.R, Garry, Rose and Mulvey, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.
Cases cited
- In re Stephanie RR. 140 AD3d 1237 at 1238 p. 1052
- In re Daniel X. 114 AD3d 1059 at 1060 p. 1052
- In re Steven M. 88 AD3d 1099 at 1100 p. 1053
- In re Maddesyn K. 63 AD3d 1199 at 1200 p. 1053
- In re Josephine BB. 114 AD3d 1096 at 1100 p. 1053
- In re Thomas M. 81 AD3d 1108 at 1109 p. 1053
- In re April WW. 133 AD3d 1113 at 1118 p. 1053
- In re Kaitlyn R. 267 AD2d 894 at 896 p. 1053
- In re Ameillia RR. 112 AD3d 1083 at 1084 p. 1053
- In re Seamus K. 33 AD3d 1030 at 1032 p. 1053
- In re Izayah J. 104 AD3d 1107 at 1109 p. 1054
- In re Brayden UU. 116 AD3d 1179 at 1181-1182 p. 1054
- In re Asianna NN. 119 AD3d 1243 at 1246 p. 1054
- In re Justin A. 133 AD3d 1106 at 1108 p. 1054
- In re Heaven H. 121 AD3d 1199 at 1200-1201 p. 1054