Majority
Appeal from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, filed June 5, 2015, which ruled, among other things, that liability did not shift to the Special Fund for Reopened Cases pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 25-a.
In May 2005, claimant sustained a work-related injury to his lower back. His claim for workers’ compensation benefits was established in July 2005; however, because it was determined that his disability was less than seven days, claimant did not have any compensable lost time from work and received no lost wage benefits. In 2014, the employer and its workers’ compensation carrier (hereinafter collectively referred to as the employer) requested a transfer of liability to the Special Fund for Reopened Cases pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law
Workers’ Compensation Law § 25-a provides that “liability for a claim shifts to the Special Fund where a workers’ compensation case that was fully closed is reopened more than seven years after the underlying injury occurred and more than three years after the last payment of compensation” (Matter of Hosey v Central N.Y. DDSO, 91 AD3d 993 , 994 [2012] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see Matter of Aposporos v NYNEX, 46 AD3d 1016 , 1016 [2007]; Matter of Bates v Finger Lakes Truck Rental, 41 AD3d 957 , 959 [2007]). “A medical report may be deemed an application to reopen if the report gives the Board sufficient notice of a change in a claimant’s condition, as opposed to simply indicating continued disability and treatment” (Matter of Gregorec v Brenners Furniture Co., Inc., 68 AD3d 1301 , 1302 [2009] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of Donnelly v Alden Cent. Schools, 83 AD3d 1368 , 1368 [2011]; Matter of Linz v Maine Endwell School Dist., 79 AD3d 1541 , 1542 [2010]). Such medical report “should not be given a strained interpretation, but should only be interpreted as a basis to reopen if that was clearly the doctor’s intention,” and the “mere mention of permanency in a medical report, absent an opinion regarding the degree of permanency, is insufficient to act as a request to reopen a case” (Matter of Gregorec v Brenners Furniture Co., Inc., 68 AD3d at 1302 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Jones v HSBC, 304 AD2d 864 , 866 [2003]). “Such a decision of the Board will not be disturbed when supported by substantial evidence” (Matter of Anticola v Tops Mkts., 117 AD3d 1373 , 1374 [2014] [citations omitted]; see Matter of Porter v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 113 AD3d 987 , 988 [2014]; Matter of Hunt v Price Chopper/Golub Corp., 85 AD3d 1522 , 1523 [2011]).
Garry, Rose, Devine and Mulvey, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
Cases cited
- Claim of Hosey v. Central New York DDSO 91 AD3d 993 at 994 p. 1212
- Claim of Aposporos v. NYNEX 46 AD3d 1016 at 1016 p. 1212
- Claim of Bates v. Finger Lakes Truck Rental 41 AD3d 957 at 959 p. 1212
- Claim of Gregorec v. Brenners Furniture Co. 68 AD3d 1301 at 1302 p. 1212
- Claim of Donnelly v. Alden Central Schools 83 AD3d 1368 at 1368 p. 1212
- Claim of Anticola v. Tops Markets 117 AD3d 1373 at 1374 p. 1212
- Claim of Porter v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp. 113 AD3d 987 at 988 p. 1212
- Claim of Hunt v. Price Chopper/Golub Corp. 85 AD3d 1522 at 1523 p. 1212
- Claim of Reddien v. Joseph Davis Inc. 136 AD3d 1144 at 1145 p. 1213
- Claim of Giansante v. Seneca Cayuga Arc 137 AD3d 1450 at 1451 p. 1213