Majority
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Bruno, J.), dated November 14, 2014, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff allegedly was injured when he fell from a ladder while painting a cottage located on the defendants’ 16-acre residential estate. The cottage was formerly the residence of the defendants’ part-time caretaker. After the caretaker moved out, the defendants retained the plaintiff’s employer, nonparty Infinity Contracting, Inc., to renovate and repair the cottage. At the time of his accident, the plaintiff was using a ladder, which he believed belonged to the defendants. According to his deposition testimony, the ground on which the ladder was placed was uneven, soft, and filled with debris as a result of ongoing landscaping work. The plaintiff testified at his deposition that the ladder was defective and that it “penetrated the ground,” causing him to fall and sustain injuries.
The plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240 (1) and 241 (6), as well as common-law negligence. The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff appeals.
The Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6). Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6) “provide an exemption for owners of single and two-family houses such that liability can only be imposed where the homeowner directs or controls the work being performed” (Tomecek v Westchester Additions & Renovations, Inc., 97 AD3d 737 , 738 [2012]). Here, the defendants made a prima facie showing that they were entitled to the protection of the homeowner’s exemption by submitting evidence demonstrating that the work being performed directly related to the residential use of the cottage and that they did not direct or control the manner in which the plaintiff performed his work (see Affri v Basch, 13 NY3d 592 ,
The Supreme Court also properly granted those branches of the defendants’ motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence. Labor Law § 200 codifies the common-law duty of an owner or contractor to provide employees with a safe place to work (see Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 NY2d 876 , 877 [1993]). “To be held liable under Labor Law § 200 for injuries arising from the manner in which work is performed, a defendant must have ‘authority to exercise supervision and control over the work’ ” (Rojas v Schwartz, 74 AJD3d 1046, 1046 [2010], quoting Gallello v MARJ Distribs., Inc., 50 AD3d 734 , 735 [2008]; see Chowdhury v Rodriguez, 57 AD3d at 127-128 ). Where the plaintiff’s injuries arise not from the manner in which the work was performed, but from a dangerous condition on the premises, a defendant may be liable under Labor Law § 200 “if it ‘either created the dangerous condition that caused the accident or had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition’ ” (Rojas v Schwartz, 74 AD3d at 1047, quoting Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d 54 , 61 [2008]). Where, as here, an accident allegedly involves defects in both the premises and the equipment used at the work site, a defendant moving for summary judgment with respect to an alleged violation of Labor Law § 200 is obligated to address the proof applicable to both liability standards (see DiMaggio v Cataletto, 117 AD3d 984 , 986 [2014]; Reyes v Arco Wentworth Mgt. Corp., 83 AD3d 47 , 52 [2011]). A defendant is entitled to summary judgment “only when the evidence exonerates it as a matter of law for all potential concurrent causes of the plaintiff’s accident and injury, and when no triable issue of fact is raised in opposition as to either relevant liability standard” (Reyes v Arco Wentworth Mgt. Corp., 83 AD3d at 52 ).
Here, the defendants met their prima facie burden. They submitted evidence demonstrating that they did not have the authority to supervise or control the performance of the plaintiff’s work (see McFadden v Lee, 62 AD3d 966 , 966 [2009]; Orellana v Butcher Ave. Bldrs., Inc., 58 AD3d 612 , 614 [2009];
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Dillon, J.P., Hall, Hinds-Radix and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Affri v. Basch 13 NY3d 592 p. 859
- Bartoo v. Buell 87 NY2d 362 at 368-369 p. 860
- Khela v. Neiger 85 NY2d 333 at 337-338 p. 860
- Chowdhury v. Rodriguez 57 AD3d 121 p. 860
- DeSabato v. 674 Carroll Street Corp. 55 AD3d 656 at 658 p. 860
- Ramirez v. Begum 35 AD3d 578 p. 860
- Zuckerman v. City of New York 49 NY2d 557 p. 860
- Farias v. Simon 122 AD3d 466 at 467 p. 860
- Krukowski v. Steffensen 194 AD2d 179 at 180-184 p. 860
- Comes v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp. 82 NY2d 876 at 877 p. 860
- Gallello v. MARJ Distributors, Inc. 50 AD3d 734 at 735 p. 860
- Ortega v. Puccia 57 AD3d 54 at 61 p. 860
- DiMaggio v. Cataletto 117 AD3d 984 at 986 p. 860
- Reyes v. Arco Wentworth Management Corp. 83 AD3d 47 at 52 p. 860
- McFadden v. Lee 62 AD3d 966 at 966 p. 860
- Orellana v. Dutcher Avenue Builders, Inc. 58 AD3d 612 at 614 p. 860
- Affri v. Basch 45 AD3d 615 at 616 p. 861
- Solazzo v. New York City Transit Authority 6 NY3d 734 at 735 p. 861
- Mitchell v. New York University 12 AD3d 200 at 201 p. 861