Majority
Appeals by the People, as limited by their brief, from (1) so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Koenderman, J.), dated January 27, 2016, as granted that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the evidence presented to the grand jury was legally insufficient, and (2) so much of an order of the same court dated March 25, 2016, as, upon, in effect, reargument, adhered to the original determination.
Ordered that the appeal from the order dated January 27, 2016, is dismissed, as that order was superseded by the order dated March 25, 2016, made upon reargument; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated March 25, 2016, is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, upon reargument, the order dated January 27, 2016, is vacated, that branch of the defendant’s omnibus motion which was to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the evidence presented to the grand jury was legally insufficient is denied, the indictment is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Queens County, for further proceedings on the indictment.
“Courts assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before a grand jury must evaluate ‘whether the evidence, viewed most
Here, the evidence presented to the grand jury, when viewed in the light most favorable to the People, was legally sufficient to establish the charge of intimidating a victim or witness in the third degree (see Penal Law § 215.15 [1]; People v Gamble, 74 NY2d 904 [1989]). The People presented evidence that, immediately following certain testimony given by a police officer against the defendant at a pretrial suppression hearing in an unrelated matter, the defendant exited the courtroom and, while standing only five to seven feet from the police officer, threatened him, using profane language. The officer testified that he took this threat very seriously and was scared. Contrary to the defendant’s contention, based on this testimony, and the inferences that logically flow therefrom, the grand jury could have reasonably inferred that the defendant threatened the police officer in an effort to intimidate him into not further testifying in the case or otherwise curtailing his cooperation with the police and prosecution (see People v Degiorgio, 36 AD3d 1007 , 1008 [2007]). Since the grand jury could have rationally drawn such an inference, the fact that the evidence
Rivera, J.P., Sgroi, Duffy and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- People v. Mills 1 NY3d 269 at 274-275 p. 979
- People v. Carroll 93 NY2d 564 at 568 p. 979
- People v. Bello 92 NY2d 523 at 525 p. 979
- People v. Jennings 69 NY2d 103 at 114 p. 979
- People v. Ryan 125 AD3d 695 at 696 p. 979
- People v. Flowers 138 AD3d 1138 at 1139 p. 979
- People v. Deegan 69 NY2d 976 at 979 p. 979
- People v. Gamble 74 NY2d 904 p. 979
- People v. Degiorgio 36 AD3d 1007 at 1008 p. 979