Majority
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Ellen M. Coin, J.), entered September 22, 2015, which, insofar as appealed from,
The complaint alleges defamation stemming from negative comments anonymously posted by defendant on various consumer review websites or shared via Facebook message. With the exception of the Facebook message (which contains statements that are largely factual in nature), the challenged statements are not actionable, because they are expressions of opinion (see Mann v Abel, 10 NY3d 271 , 276 [2008], cert denied 555 US 1170 [2009]). While the Internet reviews contain elements of both fact and opinion, when viewed in context, they suggest to a reasonable reader that the author was merely expressing his opinion based on a negative business interaction with plaintiffs (see id.; Steinhilber v Alphonse, 68 NY2d 283 , 294 [1986]). The communications have a “[l]oose, figurative or hyperbolic” tone (see Dillon v City of New York, 261 AD2d 34 , 38 [1st Dept 1999]), referring to plaintiff as a “bad apple,” “incompetent and dishonest,” and a “disastrous businessman,” from whom consumers should “[s]tay far away.” Moreover, they were posted anonymously online. As this Court has recognized, “[R]eaders give less credence to allegedly defamatory remarks published on the Internet than to similar remarks made in other contexts” (Sandals Resorts Intl. Ltd. v Google, Inc., 86 AD3d 32 , 44 [1st Dept 2011]).
The reviews are analogous to those at issue in Matter of Woodbridge Structured Funding, LLC v Pissed Consumer ( 125 AD3d 508 [1st Dept 2015]), which were found not to be actionable, although “some of the statements [were] based on undisclosed, unfavorable facts,” because “the disgruntled tone, anonymous posting, and predominant use of statements that cannot be definitively proven true or false” made them “only susceptible of a nondefamatory meaning, grounded in opinion” (id. at 509). The fact that, in this case, defendant was plaintiffs’ business partner rather than an ordinary consumer is immaterial.
An additional ground for dismissing the claims based on the Yelp review is that they are time-barred, since they were asserted after the one-year statute of limitations had run (CPLR 215 [3]). They cannot relate back to the original complaints, because those complaints were not sufficient to put defendant on notice of any Yelp-related claims (see CPLR 203 [f]; see also CPLR 3016 [a]).
Concur — Tom, J.P., Sweeny, Renwick, Moskowitz and Kapnick, JJ.
Cases cited
- Mann v. Abel 10 NY3d 271 at 276 p. 503
- Steinhilber v. Alphonse 68 NY2d 283 at 294 p. 503
- Dillon v. City of New York 261 AD2d 34 at 38 p. 503
- Sandals Resorts International Ltd. v. Google, Inc. 86 AD3d 32 at 44 p. 503
- Woodbridge Structured Funding, LLC v. Pissed Consumer 125 AD3d 508 p. 503
- Lentlie v. Egan 61 NY2d 874 at 876 p. 504
- 60 Minute Man, Ltd. v. Kossman 161 AD2d 574 at 576 p. 504