Majority
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Genovesi, J.), dated December 1, 2015, as denied their motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1), granted that branch of the cross motion of the defendant City of New York which was for summary judgment dismissing that cause of action insofar as asserted against it, and granted that branch of the separate cross motion of the defendants National Grid Electric Services, LLC, National Grid Energy Management, LLC, and Key span Energy Delivery NYC which was for summary judgment dismissing that cause of action insofar as asserted against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs payable to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
The injured plaintiff, and his wife suing derivatively, commenced this action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240 (1), and 241 (6), and common-law negligence. Regarding the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action, the plaintiffs allege that the injured plaintiff was engaged in an enumerated activity at the time of the accident because he was performing work in connection with the replacement of a “structure” — to wit, the gas main. Following discovery, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action, and the defendants City of New York and National Grid separately cross-moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing that cause of action insofar as asserted against each of them. The Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ motion and granted the cross motions.
Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that, at the time of the accident, the injured plaintiff was not engaged in an enumerated activity under Labor Law § 240 (1). That statute applies only to “the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure” (Labor Law § 240 [1]). Significantly, the statute does not cover an injury occurring after an enumerated activity is complete (see Beehner v Eckerd Corp., 3 NY3d 751 , 752 [2004]). While the plaintiffs urge that
The plaintiffs’ remaining contention is improperly raised for the first time on appeal (see Lopez v Muttana, 144 AD3d 871 [2016]; Flagstar Bank, FSB v Titus, 120 AD3d 469 [2014]; Infra-Metals Co. v DK Indus. Servs. Corp., 120 AD3d 762 [2014]; Provident Bank v Giannasca, 55 AD3d 812 [2008]).
Mastro, J.P., Dillon, Balkin and Maltese, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Beehner v. Eckerd Corp. 3 NY3d 751 at 752 p. 905
- Panek v. County of Albany 99 NY2d 452 p. 906
- Martinez v. City of New York 93 NY2d 322 p. 906
- Martinez v. City of New York 73 AD3d 993 p. 906
- Rivera v. Santos 35 AD3d 700 p. 906
- Ciesielski v. Buffalo Industrial Park, Inc. 299 AD2d 817 p. 906
- Dilluvio v. City of New York 264 AD2d 115 p. 906
- Dilluvio v. City of New York 95 NY2d 928 p. 906
- Lopez v. Muttana 144 AD3d 871 p. 906
- Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Titus 120 AD3d 469 p. 906
- Infra-Metals Co. v. DK Industrial Services Corp. 120 AD3d 762 p. 906
- Provident Bank v. Giannasca 55 AD3d 812 p. 906