Majority
In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the respondent/defendant Suffolk County Department of Public Works dated October 12, 2012, and action, among other things, for a judgment declaring that a certain agreement is void as a matter of law, the petitioner/
Ordered that the notice of appeal from so much of the order as granted those branches of the separate motions of the respondents/defendants and the additional respondents/defendants which were pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (5) to dismiss the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th causes of action insofar as asserted against each of them is deemed to be an application for leave to appeal from that portion of the order, and leave to appeal is granted (see CPLR 5701 [c]); and it is further,
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the respondents/ defendants and the additional respondents/defendants appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
The Supreme Court properly directed the dismissal of the 1st through 5th causes of action, which were asserted pursuant to CPLR article 78, as barred by the statute of limitations. A party whose interest may be adversely affected by a potential judgment must be made a party in a CPLR article 78 proceeding (see CPLR 1001 [a]). Here, the petitioner/plaintiff failed to join, within the applicable four-month statute of limitations (see CPLR 217), all necessary parties which could have been adversely affected by the petitioner/plaintiff’s challenge to a
The Supreme Court also properly directed the dismissal of the 6th, 7th, 10th, 11th, and 12th causes of action, which sought declaratory relief, as barred by the statute of limitations. “[W]hen [a] proceeding has been commenced in the form of a declaratory judgment action, for which no specific Statute of Limitations is prescribed, ‘it is necessary to examine the substance of that action to identify the relationship out of which the claim arises and the relief sought’ in order to resolve which Statute of Limitations is applicable” (New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. v McBarnette, 84 NY2d 194 , 200-201 [1994], quoting Solnick v Whalen, 49 NY2d 224 , 229 [1980]). Here, despite being couched in declaratory judgment language, the relief sought in these causes of action is available in the context of a CPLR article 78 proceeding, and thus, the four-month statute of limitations applies (see CPLR 217; Matter of Save the Pine Bush v City of Albany, 70 NY2d 193 , 202 [1987]; Tornheim v Fiala, 136 AD3d 797 , 797 [2016]). However, the petitioner/plaintiff failed to join the additional respondents/defendants, who were necessary parties, within the four-month limitations period (see CPLR 217; Windy Ridge Farm v Assessor of Town of Shandaken, 11 NY3d at 727 ), and failed to demonstrate that the relation-back doctrine applied (see Matter of Ayuda Re Funding, LLC v Town of Liberty, 121 AD3d at 1475-1476 ).
The petitioner/plaintiff’s remaining contention is without merit.
Rivera, J.P, Austin, Cohen and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Windy Ridge Farm v. Assessor of Shandaken 11 NY3d 725 at 727 p. 944
- Ayuda Re Funding, LLC v. Town of Liberty 121 AD3d 1474 at 1475-1476 p. 944
- Karagiannis v. North Shore Long Island Jewish Health System, Inc. 80 AD3d 569 at 569-570 p. 944
- Cybul v. Village of Scarsdale 17 AD3d 462 at 463 p. 944
- New York City Health & Hospitals Corp. v. McBarnette 84 NY2d 194 at 200-201 p. 944
- Solnick v. Whalen 49 NY2d 224 at 229 p. 944
- Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. City of Albany 70 NY2d 193 at 202 p. 944
- Tornheim v. Fiala 136 AD3d 797 at 797 p. 944