Majority
Appeals by the defendant from (1) a judgment of the County Court, Dutchess County (Greller, J.), rendered August 21, 2014, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree under indictment No. 77/13, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence, and (2) a judgment of the same court, also rendered August 21, 2014, convicting him of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree under Superior Court Information No. 175/14, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgments are affirmed.
The defendant contends that both of his pleas of guilty were not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent because he had an active mental illness at the time of the pleas, he was equivocal about his decision to plead guilty, and the County Court failed to fully explain his constitutional rights. However, this conten
Furthermore, while the defendant had been prescribed medications by a psychiatrist, there is no basis in the record to support the conclusion that, at the time of the plea proceeding, the defendant lacked the capacity to understand the nature of the proceeding or the consequences of his pleas (see People v DeBenedetto, 120 AD3d 1428 , 1429 [2014]). During the plea colloquy, the defendant indicated that he was clear headed and understood everything that was happening.
The defendant’s contention that the felony complaint charging him with criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree was jurisdictionally defective is also without merit. An accusatory instrument charging that offense need not allege a previous conviction in order to be sufficient as that is not an element of the offense (see Penal Law § 265.03; People v Jones, 22 NY3d 53 , 59 [2013]). As such, the allegation that the defendant’s youthful offender adjudication was a previous conviction was a minor inaccuracy and did not render the felony complaint jurisdictionally defective (see People v Hansen, 95 NY2d 227 , 231 [2000]). Further, the waiver of indictment and Superior Court Information properly alleged that the defendant’s conviction for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree was a previous conviction (see Penal Law § 265.03).
The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80 [1982]).
Chambers, J.P., Roman, LaSalle and Bar-ros, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- People v. Peque 22 NY3d 168 at 182 p. 823
- People v. Jackson 114 AD3d 807 p. 823
- People v. Swindell 72 AD3d 1340 at 1341 p. 823
- People v. Harris 61 NY2d 9 at 19-20 p. 823
- People v. Sirico 135 AD3d 19 at 22 p. 823
- People v. Isaiah S. 130 AD3d 1081 p. 823
- People v. Jones 22 NY3d 53 at 59 p. 823
- People v. Hansen 95 NY2d 227 at 231 p. 823
- People v. Suitte 90 AD2d 80 p. 823