Majority
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with one bill of costs, and the defendants’ separate motions for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them are denied.
The plaintiff allegedly was injured when she stepped into a pothole while crossing Atkins Avenue in Brooklyn, just outside the gate of the tenants’ parking lot for the Arlington Village apartment complex (hereinafter Arlington Village) where she lived. The plaintiff commenced this action against the owner of Arlington Village, the defendant Rita Stark, as executrix of estate of Fred Stark, and Rita Stark, individually (hereinafter the owner), and the defendant City of New York, to recover damages for her alleged personal injuries. The City and the owner separately moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them. The Supreme Court granted both motions, and the plaintiff appeals. We reverse.
Insofar as relevant here, pursuant to Administrative Code of the City of New York § 7-201 (c) (2), no civil action may be maintained against the City for personal injuries sustained as a consequence of an alleged dangerous condition in the roadway unless written notice of the defective condition was actually given to the appropriate person authorized to receive such notice, or there is a written acknowledgment from the City of the defective condition (see Bruni v City of New York, 2 NY3d 319 , 324 [2004]; DeGroat v City of New York, 148 AD3d 670 [2017]). The City failed to establish, prima facie, the absence of a written acknowledgment of the alleged dangerous condition. Documents produced by the City’s Department of Transportation demonstrated that the City acknowledged in writing that a pothole existed in the vicinity of the plaintiff’s accident (see Bruni v City of New York, 2 NY3d at 325 ; DeGroat v City of New York, 148 AD3d 670 [2017]). Any dispute as to the precise location of the noticed pothole is a question of fact for the jury (see Donnellan v City of New York, 112 AD3d 780 , 781 [2013]; Almadotter v City of New York, 15 AD3d 426 , 427 [2005]; Quinn v City of New York, 305 AD2d 570 , 571 [2003]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the City’s motion regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s opposing papers (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 , 853 [1985]).
Rivera, J.P., Leventhal, Austin and Cohen, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Donnellan v. City of New York 112 AD3d 780 at 781 p. 837
- Almadotter v. City of New York 15 AD3d 426 at 427 p. 837
- Quinn v. City of New York 305 AD2d 570 at 571 p. 837
- Winegrad v. New York University Medical Center 64 NY2d 851 at 853 p. 837
- Hausser v. Giunta 88 NY2d 449 at 452-453 p. 838
- Grier v. 35-63 Realty, Inc. 70 AD3d 772 at 773 p. 838
- Lewis v. Palazzolo 143 AD3d 783 at 785 p. 838
- Posner v. New York City Transit Authority 27 AD3d 542 at 544 p. 838
- Alleyne v. City of New York 89 AD3d 970 at 972 p. 838
- Moscato v. City of New York 16 AD3d 470 at 470-471 p. 838