People v. Babcock

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Ulster County (Williams, J.), rendered December 20, 2013, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crime of manslaughter in the first degree.

At approximately 8:40 a.m. on March 6, 2013, defendant called 911 to report that the victim, his fiancée, had fallen down the front stairs of her residence and injured herself. The victim was thereafter transported to the hospital where she underwent surgery and died the following day. Defendant was arrested and subsequently charged by indictment with manslaughter in the first degree. County Court ordered an examination pursuant to CPL article 730 to determine defendant’s competence to stand trial and, following a hearing, found de

We reject defendant’s contention that County Court erred in finding him competent to proceed to trial. “The key inquiry in determining whether a criminal defendant is fit for trial is whether he or she has sufficient present ability to consult with his or her lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he or she has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him or her” (People v Phillips, 16 NY3d 510 , 516 [2011] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]; accord People v Hadfield, 119 AD3d 1217 , 1218-1219 [2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 989 [2015]; People v Kendall, 91 AD3d 1191 , 1192 [2012]; see CPL 730.10 [1]). “In making this determination, a court may take into account the findings of any competency examination as well as its own observations of the defendant” (.People v Kendall, 91 AD3d at 1192 [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see People v Phillips, 16 NY3d at 517 ; People v Mendez, 1 NY3d 15 , 20 [2003]). Notably, “trial fitness is a legal, judicial determination, and not a medical one” (People v Phillips, 16 NY3d at 517 ; see People v Campbell, 279 AD2d 797 , 798 [2001], lv denied 96 NY2d 826 [2001]), and we accord considerable deference to a trial court’s determination in this regard, particularly where, as here, it was presented with conflicting testimony as to the defendant’s competence (see People v Surdis, 77 AD3d 1018 , 1018-1019 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 800 [2011]; People v Johnson, 52 AD3d 1040 , 1042 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 833 [2008]; People v Campbell, 279 AD2d at 798 ).

Defendant was examined by three psychiatrists. Two psychiatrists, who testified on behalf of defendant, concluded that defendant was incompetent to stand trial, whereas the psychiatrist retained by the People found defendant competent to stand trial and concluded that defendant had feigned psychiatric symptoms to meet his personal needs. The People’s psychiatrist, who had extensive experience in conducting CPL article 730 examinations, interviewed defendant for approximately one hour, reviewed relevant documents and reached his conclusion based upon his objective observations and independent documentary review. By contrast, the two psychiatrists retained by defendant based their opinions exclusively upon defendant’s own statements made to them during interviews, without providing any objective proof of de

We turn next to defendant’s challenge to County Court’s Molineux rulings, which permitted the People to introduce evidence of defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence against the victim. “Evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts may be admissible when it is relevant to a material issue in the case other than defendant’s criminal propensity. Where there is a proper nonpropensity purpose, the decision whether to admit such evidence rests upon the trial court’s discretionary balancing of probative value and unfair prejudice” (People v Leeson, 12 NY3d 823 , 826-827 [2009] [internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipses and citations omitted]; see People v Westerling, 48 AD3d 965 , 966 [2008]; People v Miles, 36 AD3d 1021 , 1022-1023 [2007], lv denied 8 NY3d 988 [2007]). Here, County Court properly found that evidence regarding prior instances of defendant’s abusive and controlling behavior toward the victim were relevant and material to the issues of intent, motive and the absence of accident and provided necessary background information concerning the tumultuous relationship between defendant and the victim (see People v Womack, 143 AD3d 1171 , 1173 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 1151 [2017]; People v Pham, 118 AD3d 1159 , 1161 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1087 [2014]; People v Lubrano, 117 AD3d 1239 , 1241 [2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 990 [2015]; People v Burkett, 101 AD3d 1468 , 1470-1471 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1096 [2013]). The court also engaged in a proper balancing of the probative value of the evidence

Defendant also asserts that his conviction is against the weight of the evidence. If, in conducting a weight of the evidence review, we conclude that an acquittal would not have been unreasonable, we “must, like the trier of fact below, weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony” in order to decide whether the jury was justified in finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490 , 495 [1987] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Kancharla, 23 NY3d 294 , 302-303 [2014]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 , 348 [2007]). As relevant here, “a person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when he or she, with intent to cause serious physical injury to the victim, causes the victim’s death” (People v Kenyon, 108 AD3d 933 , 937 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1075 [2013]; see Penal Law § 125.20 [1]). A defendant’s intent to cause serious physical injury “may be inferred from his or her conduct and from the surrounding circumstances” (People v Cole, 150 AD3d 1476 , 1481 [2017] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Gordon, 23 NY3d 643 , 650 [2014]; People v Rogers, 94 AD3d 1246 , 1250 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 977 [2012]).

At trial, the People presented evidence that defendant claimed during a police interview that, while he was assisting the victim — who suffered from multiple sclerosis — descend a four-step staircase to leave the house, she slipped and fell

With regard to the victim’s injuries, the pathologist who conducted an autopsy on the victim testified that the victim died from “multiple blunt force injuries and strangulation with bilateral subdural hemorrhages . . . and cerebral edema.” The pathologist explained that there were two separate injuries to the victim’s brain that were inflicted by blunt force trauma and that the injuries both contributed to the victim’s death and could not have resulted from a single fall. The pathologist testified further that the victim’s neck area bore injuries that were consistent with having been strangulated, and that the bruises on the victim’s arms were indicative of her being grabbed tightly by her arms during a fight. The pathologist also opined that the scratches on the victim’s back, hemorrhaging on her ankles and the fact that the victim’s shirt and bra were rolled up over her chest supported an inference that the victim had been held by her ankles and dragged a certain distance.

With respect to the element of intent, the People called three witnesses who testified to defendant’s previous abusive and controlling behavior toward the victim. The victim’s son testified to a prolonged and escalating argument between the victim and defendant in December 2012, during which defendant called the victim derogatory names such as an “F’ing bitch and

Nor are we persuaded that County Court erred in failing to instruct five spectators in the courtroom who were wearing purple ribbons that signified their opposition to domestic violence to remove the ribbons. The Court of Appeals recently addressed spectator conduct in People v Nelson ( 27 NY3d 361 [2016], cert denied 580 US —, 137 S Ct 175 [2016]), wherein the Court instructed that “[w]hether [a] trial court should intervene, and what intervention is appropriate, must depend upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case” (id. at 369). In deciding whether and how to intervene in spectator conduct, a trial court may consider a number of factors, including, but not limited to, “the particular nature of the spectator conduct at issue; how many spectators are involved; the duration of the conduct; whether the involved spectators have called attention to themselves in some way; where the spectators are seated in the courtroom; whether the jury can see or did see the spectator conduct; . . . [and] whether the spectator conduct is the result of some intentional effort to influence the jury or merely an unintended display of emotion” (id.). Given the trial court’s superior ability to view all of the surrounding circumstances and fashion an appropriate intervention, we review that court’s action or inaction for an abuse of discretion (see id. at 370).

Here, in refusing to prohibit the five spectators from wearing

As a final matter, we reject defendant’s contention that the maximum sentence imposed was harsh and excessive. While County Court’s remarks at sentencing regarding the punishment that defendant would receive outside of the judicial system were better left unsaid, we do not find them to be “so ‘intemperate’ that modification of the sentence is required” (People v Pimentel, 108 AD3d 861 , 863-864 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1076 [2013]; see People v Lopez, 51 AD3d 1210 , 1211 [2008]; compare People v Theodore, 113 AD3d 703 , 704 [2014]). Considering the violent nature of the offense, defendant’s lack of remorse and his extensive criminal history, which includes an incident wherein he assaulted his pregnant ex-girlfriend with a baseball bat, we discern neither an abuse of discretion nor extraordinary circumstances warranting a reduction of the sentence in the interest of justice (see People v Coley, 129 AD3d 1327 , 1330 [2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 927 [2015]; People v Burkett, 101 AD3d at 1473 ; People v Morey, 304 AD2d 855 , 856 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 564 [2003]).

Garry, Rose, Clark and Rumsey, JJ., concur.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.