Majority
In a hybrid proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, inter alia, to review a determination of the City Council of the City of Long Beach dated March 3, 2015, to award contracts for the construction of comfort stations along the City of Long Beach boardwalk, and action for a judgment declaring that the construction of a structure known as the Lincoln Boulevard Comfort Station is a prohibited use of a public street and related injunctive relief, the petitioners/plaintiffs appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Mahon, J.), entered September 25, 2015, as, upon denying their motion for a preliminary injunction, in effect, determined that the construction of the structure known as the Lincoln Boulevard Comfort Station is not a prohibited use of a public street, denied the petition, and dismissed the hybrid proceeding/ action.
Ordered that the order and judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof, in effect, dismissing the action, and adding thereto a provision declaring that the construction of the structure known as the Lincoln Boulevard Comfort Station is a permitted use of a public street; as so modified, the order and judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the respondents/defendants.
In this hybrid proceeding and action, the petitioners/ plaintiffs (hereinafter the petitioners) sought, inter alia, to
“To establish standing under SEQRA, a petitioner must show (1) an environmental injury that is in some way different from that of the public at large, and (2) that the alleged injury falls within the zone of interests sought to be protected or promoted by SEQRA” (Matter of Brummel v Town of N. Hempstead Town Bd., 145 AD3d 880 , 881-882 [2016]). The alleged harm cannot be “too speculative and conjectural to demonstrate an actual and specific injury-in-fact” (Matter of Kindred v Monroe County, 119 AD3d 1347 , 1348 [2014]). Close proximity alone is insufficient to confer standing where there are no zoning issues involved, and general environmental concerns will not suffice (see Matter of Sun-Brite Car Wash v Board of Zoning & Appeals of Town of N. Hempstead, 69 NY2d 406 , 410 [1987]; Matter of Kindred v Monroe County, 119 AD3d 1347 [2014]; Matter of Save Our Main St. Bldgs. v Greene County Legislature, 293 AD2d 907 [2002]; Matter of Oates v Village of Watkins Glen, 290 AD2d 758 , 761 [2002]). Moreover, “[t]o qualify for standing to raise a SEQRA challenge, a party must demonstrate that it will suffer an injury that is environmental and not solely economic in nature” (Matter of Mobil Oil Corp. v Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 76 NY2d 428 , 433 [1990]). Here, the petitioners’ alleged environmentally related injuries are too speculative and conjectural to demonstrate an actual and specific injury-in-fact (see Matter of Brummel v Town of N. Hempstead Town Bd., 145 AD3d at 881-882 ; Matter of Shelter Is. Assn. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Shelter Is., 57 AD3d 907 [2008]).
“When lands adjoin private property an easement of light,
Here, the proposed construction will not completely block the petitioners’ ocean view nor prevent the petitioners from using the public street. Rather, the length of the dead-end street will be shortened and several public parking spaces will be removed. The turnaround will still be intact, although moved 23 feet to the north, and access to the petitioners’ driveway and building’s entrance will not be impeded (see Perlmutter v Greene, 259 NY at 333 ). In addition, the disputed comfort station will be open to, and for the purpose of, serving the public (cf. Peterson v City of New York, 260 NY 156 , 161 [1932]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly, in effect, determined that the construction is not a prohibited use of a public street, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding. Since this is, in part, a declaratory judgment action, the order and judgment should have included a provision declaring that the construction is a permitted use of a public street (see Lanza v Wagner, 11 NY2d 317 [1962]).
Rivera, J.P., Hall, Barros and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Brummel v. Town of North Hempstead Town Board 145 AD3d 880 at 881-882 p. 836
- Kindred v. Monroe County 119 AD3d 1347 at 1348 p. 836
- Sun-Brite Car Wash, Inc. v. Board of Zoning & Appeals 69 NY2d 406 at 410 p. 836
- Save Our Main Street Buildings v. Greene County Legislature 293 AD2d 907 p. 836
- Oates v. Village of Watkins Glen 290 AD2d 758 at 761 p. 836
- Mobil Oil Corp. v. Syracuse Industrial Development Agency 76 NY2d 428 at 433 p. 836
- Shelter Island Ass'n v. Zoning Board of Appeals 57 AD3d 907 p. 836
- Scoglio v. County of Suffolk 85 NY2d 709 at 712 p. 837
- Regan v. Lanze 40 NY2d 475 at 482 p. 837
- Donahue v. Keystone Gas Co. 181 NY 313 at 316 p. 837
- Lahr v. Metropolitan Elevated Railway Co. 104 NY 268 at 291 p. 837
- Griefer v. County of Sullivan 273 NY 515 p. 837
- Perlmutter v. Greene 259 NY 327 p. 837
- Sauer v. City of New York 206 US 536 at 547-548 p. 837
- Jones Beach Boulevard Estate, Inc. v. Moses 268 NY 362 at 368 p. 837
- Aero Drive-In, Inc. v. Town of Cheektowaga 140 AD2d 932 p. 837
- Peterson v. City of New York 260 NY 156 at 161 p. 837
- Lanza v. Wagner 11 NY2d 317 p. 837