Majority
In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (King, J.), dated September 8, 2015, which denied its motion for a judgment of foreclosure and sale and to appoint a referee to conduct a sale of the subject premises, and granted those branches of the cross motion of the defendant Jillian Telford which were to vacate an order of reference and default judgment of the same court dated September 23, 2014, entered upon her failure to appear in the action or answer the complaint, and for leave to serve a late answer.
Ordered that the order dated September 8, 2015, is reversed, on the law, with costs, the plaintiffs motion for a judgment of foreclosure and sale and to appoint a referee to conduct a sale of the subject premises is granted, and those branches of the cross motion of the defendant Jillian Telford which were to vacate the order of reference and default judgment dated September 23, 2014, and for leave to serve a late answer are denied.
The Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendant Jillian Telford’s cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (4) to vacate the order of reference and default judgment entered upon her failure to appear or answer the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The process server’s
Regarding that branch of Telford’s cross motion which was to vacate the order of reference and default judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1), Telford failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for her default since the only excuse she proffered was that she was not served with process (see Matter of Foreclosure of Tax Liens, 144 AD3d 1033 , 1034 [2016]; Sass Muni IV DTR v Braxter, 143 AD3d 798 , 799 [2016]). The absence of a reasonable excuse for the default renders it unnecessary to determine whether she demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious defense (see Bank of Am., N.A. v Agarwal, 150 AD3d 651 [2017]; Sass Muni IV DTR v Braxter, 143 AD3d at 799 ). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of Telford’s cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (1) to vacate the order of reference and default judgment.
For the same reasons, the plaintiff’s motion for a judgment of foreclosure and sale and to appoint a referee to conduct a sale of the subject premises should have been granted (see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Stewart, 146 AD3d 921 , 922 [2017]).
Dillon, J.P., Roman, Miller and LaSalle, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Washington Mutual Bank v. Huggins 140 AD3d 858 at 859 p. 882
- Bank of New York v. Espejo 92 AD3d 707 at 708 p. 882
- Roberts v. Anka 45 AD3d 752 at 754 p. 882
- Wachovia Bank, National Ass'n v. Greenberg 138 AD3d 984 at 985 p. 882
- In re Foreclosure of Tax Liens by Proceeding in Rem. Village/Town of Scarsdale 144 AD3d 1033 at 1034 p. 882
- Muni v. Braxter 143 AD3d 798 at 799 p. 882
- Bank of America, N.A. v. Agarwal 150 AD3d 651 p. 882
- Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Stewart 146 AD3d 921 at 922 p. 882