Majority
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (O’Connor, J.), entered February 8, 2016 in Albany County, which granted a motion by defendant Rytec Corporation to dismiss the third amended complaint against it.
On August 1, 2014, three days before the statute of limitations was to expire, plaintiff commenced this action to recover for injuries he allegedly sustained in August 2011 when an overhead door fell from a raised position and struck him (see CPLR 214). Within his initial complaint, plaintiff designated the corporate entities “who designed, manufactured, sold, distributed, assembled, installed, maintained, repaired and/or serviced the overhead door[ ],” as John Does Nos. 4 through 6. On June 4, 2015, plaintiff filed a third amended complaint identifying defendant Rytec Corporation as John Doe No. 5. Rytec thereafter filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss the complaint against it on the ground that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff opposed, asserting that he had adhered to the procedure set out by CPLR 1024, which allowed the filing of the third amended complaint to relate back to the date that the original complaint was filed — before the statute of limitations expired. In reply, Rytec argued that plaintiff had not adhered to the requirements of this provision, as he had not demonstrated due diligence in attempting to learn its identity. Supreme Court granted Rytec’s motion. Plaintiff appeals.
The statutory provision allowing commencement of an action against unknown parties does not toll the statute of limitations (see CPLR 1024; Kaczmarek v Benedictine Hosp., 176 AD2d 1183 , 1183-1184 [1991]; Green v County of Fulton, 123 AD2d 88 , 90 [1987]). As Supreme Court held, plaintiff was required to serve all parties within 120 days of filing, or seek leave to extend the time for service “upon good cause shown or in the interest of justice” (CPLR 306-b; see Bumpus v New York City Tr. Auth., 66 AD3d 26 , 31 [2009]). Here, plaintiff failed to seek leave to extend the time for service prior to expiration of the statutory limitations period.
Accordingly, we find that Supreme Court properly granted Rytec’s motion to dismiss the third amended complaint against it, as it was barred by the statute of limitations (see Holmes v City of New York, 132 AD3d at 954 ; Temple v New York Community Hosp. of Brooklyn, 89 AD3d at 928 ; compare Henderson-Jones v City of New York, 87 AD3d 498 , 506 [2011]).
McCarthy, J.P, Lynch, Rose and Devine, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
* Defendant’s arguments to this effect in reply were made in rebuttal to plaintiff’s opposition to the motion and did not constitute improper new assertions (see Jacobson v Leemilts Petroleum, Inc., 101 AD3d 1599 , 1600 [2012]).
Cases cited
- Kaczmarek v. Benedictine Hospital 176 AD2d 1183 at 1183-1184 p. 997
- Green v. County of Fulton 123 AD2d 88 at 90 p. 997
- Holmes v. City of New York 132 AD3d 952 at 954 p. 998
- Luckern v. Lyonsdale Energy Ltd. Partnership 229 AD2d 249 at 253 p. 998
- Temple v. New York Community Hospital of Brooklyn 89 AD3d 926 at 928 p. 998
- Hall v. S.H. Gopinatha Rao 26 AD3d 694 at 695 p. 998
- U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Losner 145 AD3d 935 at 937 p. 998
- Henderson-Jones v. City of New York 87 AD3d 498 at 506 p. 998