Maisto v. State

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (O’Connor, J.), entered September 22, 2016 in Albany County, upon a decision of the court in favor of defendant.

Plaintiffs, parents of minor students in multiple small city school districts outside of New York City, commenced this declaratory judgment action in October 2008 seeking, among other things, declarations that defendant’s failure to appropriate sufficient funds to permit the school districts at issue to provide plaintiffs’ children with a sound basic education violated the Education Article of the NY Constitution (see NY Const, art XI, § 1). Plaintiffs also requested injunctive relief compelling defendant to establish and maintain an education aid system and funding levels sufficient to enable the districts to provide a meaningful opportunity for plaintiffs’ children to receive a sound basic education meeting the minimal standards established by the Court of Appeals (see generally Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v State of New York, 8 NY3d 14 [2006] [hereinafter CFE III]] Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 100 NY2d 893 [2003] [hereinafter CFE II]; Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 86 NY2d 307 [1995] [hereinafter CFE I] [hereinafter collectively referred to as the CFE cases]). Following joinder of issue, defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to CPLR 3211, contending

As noted by the Court of Appeals, crafting an appropriate remedy for an established constitutional violation is a particularly complex and vexing issue that implicates fundamental separation of powers concerns (id. at 925). To that end, although the Judiciary must “defer to the Legislature in matters of policymaking, particularly in a matter so vital as education financing,” it must perform its duty “to define, and safeguard, rights provided by the [NY] Constitution” (id.). In balancing those concerns, the Court of Appeals instructed in CFE II “that the funding level necessary to provide [New York] City students with the opportunity for a sound basic education is an ascertainable starting point [and that] [o]nce the necessary funding level is determined, the question will be whether the inputs and outputs improve to a constitutionally acceptable level” (id. at 930). Defendant was directed to “ascertain the actual cost of providing a sound basic education in New York City” and to enact “[r]eforms to the current system of financing school funding and managing schools [that] address the shortcomings of the current system by ensuring, as a part of that process, that every school in New York City would have the resources necessary for providing the opportunity for a sound basic education” (id.). The Court of Appeals further directed that defendant “ensure a system of accountability to measure whether the reforms actually provide the opportunity for a sound basic education” (id.).

In CFE III, the Court of Appeals considered the adequacy of the remedy proposed in response to the directives of CFE II. Based on its review of the methodology utilized, the Court held that defendant’s conclusion that an additional $1.93 billion of annual aid for the New York City schools at issue in the CFE cases was necessary to provide students attending those schools with a sound basic education was reasonable and deserving of

At trial, plaintiffs and defendant presented extensive evidence regarding each of the CFE II factors, namely, inputs, outputs and causation, and Supreme Court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiffs’ case, finding that plaintiffs had submitted sufficient evidence to establish prima facie violations in accordance with the CFE II standards. Ultimately, however, the court dismissed the third amended complaint, concluding that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant did not meet its constitutional obligation to provide plaintiffs’ children with the opportunity for sound basic education. In reaching this conclusion, the court expressly found that consideration of the CFE II factors was not required in “the post-CFE environment” ( 56 Misc 3d 295 , 304 [2016]). Supreme Court both mischaracterized the nature of plaintiffs’ claims and erred in concluding — without either reference to the CFE II factors or making specific findings of fact on this point — that the level of funding actually provided by defendant was constitutionally adequate because it exceeded the amount proposed by then Governor Pataki in 2006 in accordance with the methodology that the Court of Appeals held met constitutional standards with respect to New York City schools in CFE III.

Although a claim based solely upon the allegation that Foundation Aid was reduced is insufficient to state a cause of action for violation of the Education Article (see Aristy-Farer v State of New York, 29 NY3d at 513-514 ), plaintiffs did more than simply put forth that conclusory assertion. Plaintiffs’ causes of action — grounded in the assertion that the actual funding levels provided following the CFE cases were insufficient to provide the affected students with a sound basic education — were based on detailed, district-specific allegations of insufficient inputs, deficient outputs and causation. More to the point, plaintiffs’ proof at trial, which Supreme Court acknowledged established a prima facie case that defendant failed to fulfill its constitutional obligation, was more than sufficient to require analysis under the CFE II framework on a district-by-district basis (see Aristy-Farer v State of New York,

Each of the factors making remittal appropriate is present in this case. The record is extensive. The trial was conducted over a two-month period, generating a record consisting of more than 5,000 pages of transcribed testimony, 356 exhibits totaling more than 50,000 pages and a posttrial statement of some undisputed facts. The determinative issues were entirely unaddressed and remain unresolved, there having been no disposi-tive analysis as required by CFE II. Although Supreme Court found that the performance of the children attending the school districts at issue was “undeniably inadequate” and “not acceptable” ( 56 Misc 3d at 299, 307 ) — a point conceded by defendant — it made no findings of fact with respect to the adequacy of the inputs or causation.

Although there is significant data in the record — including the stipulated facts regarding student enrollments and demographic characteristics, staffing counts and ratios, class sizes and per pupil expenditures — expert testimony is required to resolve the determinative issues of inputs and causation, and the parties adduced extensive expert testimony on these issues. Plaintiffs called five expert witnesses and elicited opinions from additional witnesses, while defendant called nine expert witnesses. In summary, plaintiffs’ witnesses asserted that the school districts at issue lack the financial resources necessary to provide the services required to effectively educate the high-need student populations each serves — for example, smaller class sizes, additional social workers, academic intervention services, language services and extended learning opportunities — and that additional funds that would enable the school districts to provide such services would improve results. By contrast, defendant’s expert witnesses opined that each of the affected school districts was provided with sufficient resources to provide a sound basic education to their respective students, that the unsatisfactory results, or outputs, resulted from suboptimal use of the available re

The enormity of this undertaking is illustrated by the need to make the required determinations separately for each of the eight school districts at issue, which varied in significant respects, such as the needs of their respective student populations, the level of local funding each received and the services each provided to students. Accordingly, we remit this matter to Supreme Court for a decision setting forth its findings of fact with respect to inputs and causation for each of the school districts at issue and for entry of a declaratory judgment on each of the relevant causes of action asserted in the third amended complaint.

On remittal, Supreme Court must weigh the adequacy of the inputs — on a district-by-district basis — by considering the quality of teaching instruction, the adequacy of school facilities and classrooms and the availability of appropriate “instrumentalities of learning,” including classroom supplies, textbooks, libraries and computers (Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 100 NY2d at 908-914 ). When evaluating the quality of teaching instruction, consideration should be given to whether class sizes must be reduced and whether additional supplemental services — for example, academic intervention services, language services, extended learning opportunities or additional social workers — must be provided to enable students in each of the districts to attain a sound basic education (see Aristy-Farer v State of New York, 29 NY3d at 514-515 ; Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 100 NY2d at 915 ). For any district where the court finds that inputs were insufficient, it must determine — on a district-by-district basis— whether plaintiffs have established causation by showing that increased funding can provide inputs that yield better student performance (see Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York, 100 NY2d at 919 ).

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments and find that they have been rendered academic or lack merit.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and matter remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court’s decision.