Gonzalez v. Bishop

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Donna M. Mills, J.), entered February 3, 2017, which denied defendant Bishop’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against her, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, a prior court decision granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment did not find that defendant Bishop was negligent in connection with the motor vehicle collision, because plaintiff, who was a passenger in Pulinario’s vehicle, was granted summary judgment only “to the extent that plaintiff is deemed free of culpable conduct.”

Bishop met her prima facie burden for summary judgment by demonstrating that Pulinario was negligent as a matter of law, and that Bishop was not negligently operating her vehicle. Bishop and plaintiff testified that Pulinario failed to stop for a stop sign, which is a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1142 (a) and 1172 (a), which constitutes negligence as a matter of law (see Pace v Robinson, 88 AD3d 530 , 531 [1st Dept 2011]; see e.g. Sanchez v Lonero Tr., Inc., 100 AD3d 417 [1st Dept 2012]). Bishop, who had the right of way, was “ ‘entitled to anticipate that other vehicles will obey the traffic laws that require them to yield,’ and ha[d] ‘no duty to watch for and avoid a driver who might fail to stop . . . at a stop sign’ ” (Dinham v Wagner, 48 AD3d 349 , 349-350 [1st Dept 2008] [citations omitted]).

Plaintiff’s and Pulinario’s contention that Bishop was speeding was speculative and conclusory (see Murchison v Incognoli, 5 AD3d 271 [1st Dept 2004]; Cardona v Fiorentina, 149 AD3d 495 [1st Dept 2017]).

We have considered respondents’ remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

Concur—Friedman, J.P., Richter, Gesmer, Kern and Moulton, JJ.