Majority
In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, etc., the defendant Bette Nyhlen appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Pitts, J.), dated April 28, 2004, as denied her motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her as time-barred.
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed.
An action sounding in medical malpractice must be commenced within two years and six months of the act, omission, or failure complained of, or last treatment where there is continuous treatment for the same illness, injury, or condition which gave rise to the said act, omission, or failure (see CPLR 214-a). The appellant established, prima facie, her entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the action was commenced more than 272 years after the last date on which she rendered professional services to the plaintiff Joanne Magalios (see Cox v Kingsboro Med. Group, 88 NY2d 904 , 906 [1996]). In opposition to the appellant’s motion, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to the applicability of the continuous treatment doctrine, upon which
Cases cited
- Cox v. Kingsboro Medical Group 88 NY2d 904 at 906 p. 719
- Nykorchuck v. Henriques 78 NY2d 255 at 258-259 p. 720
- Davis v. City of New York 38 NY2d 257 at 260 p. 720
- Schatten v. Robbins 295 AD2d 335 at 336 p. 720
- Couch v. County of Suffolk 296 AD2d 194 p. 720
- Elkin v. Goodman 285 AD2d 484 p. 720