Majority
In action, inter alia, to recover damages for conversion, the plaintiff appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Tolbert, J.), entered October 20, 2004, which granted the motion of the defendant Wanda Y. Negron to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against her, and (2) an order of the same court entered December 15, 2004, which granted the oral application of the defendant Sayegh & Sayegh, EC., to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
Ordered that on the Court’s own motion, the notice of appeal from the order entered December 15, 2004, is treated as an application for leave to appeal, and leave to appeal is granted (see CFLR 5701 [a] [3]); and it is further,
Ordered that the orders are affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the appellant’s contention, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant Wanda Y. Negron (see Small v Lorillard Tobacco Co., 94 NY2d 43 , 57 [1999]; Rastelli v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 79 NY2d 289 , 295 [1992]).
The plaintiffs theory of liability against the defendant Sayegh & Sayegh, EC. (hereinafter the Sayegh firm) was one of vicarious liability, premised on Negron’s alleged employment at that firm. Even assuming that she was so employed at the relevant
Cases cited
- Small v. Lorillard Tobacco Co. 94 NY2d 43 at 57 p. 652
- Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 79 NY2d 289 at 295 p. 652
- Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc. 51 NY2d 531 at 545-546 p. 653
- Wende C. v. United Methodist Church 6 AD3d 1047 at 1052 p. 653
- Wende C. v. United Methodist Church 4 NY3d 293 p. 653