Majority
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Gigante, J.), entered March 3, 2005, as denied their cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ causes of action to recover damages based on Labor Law § 240 (1), § 241 (6), and § 200 and common-law negligence.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provisions thereof denying those branches of the defendants’ cross motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240 (1) and § 241 (6) causes of action and substituting therefor provisions granting those branches of the cross motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the defendants.
The injured plaintiff, an oil burner repairman, was dispatched to replace a defective safety valve on a boiler at a residential building owned by the defendant Amato Froperties, LLC. The superintendent of the building is alleged to have provided the injured plaintiff with a ladder to reach the safety valve, which was on the top of the boiler. While the injured plaintiff was on the ladder installing the new safety valve, the ladder collapsed and caused him to fall on his back and shoulder.
To recover under Labor Law § 241 (6), a plaintiff must establish the violation in connection with construction, demolition or excavation, of an Industrial Code provision which sets forth specific, applicable safety standards (see Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494 , 503-505 [1993]; Weingarten v Windsor Owners Corp., 5 AD3d 674 , 677 [2004]). The Industrial Code provisions cited by the plaintiffs in their bill of particulars are inapplicable to the facts of this case. Moreover, the injured plaintiff was engaged in maintenance work not related to construction, excavation, or demolition (see Goad v Southern Elec. Intl., supra). Therefore, that branch of the cross motion which was to dismiss the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action should have been granted (see Weingarten v Windsor Owners Corp., supra at 677 ).
Labor Law § 200 is a codification of the common-law duty imposed on owners and contractors to maintain a reasonably safe construction site (see Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., supra at 505). The statute applies, inter alia, to owners and contractors who either created a dangerous condition or had actual or constructive notice of it (see Bradley v Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 21 AD3d 866 , 868 [2005]; Shipkoski v Watch Case Factory Assoc., 292 AD2d 589 , 590 [2002]).
The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendants’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action because the defendants failed to establish prima facie their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851 , 853 [1985]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 , 562 [1980]). Specifically, the defendants failed to produce evidence that they
Cases cited
- Smith v. Shell Oil Co. 85 NY2d 1000 at 1002 p. 507
- Abbatiello v. Lancaster Studio Associates 3 NY3d 46 at 53 p. 507
- Jani v. City of New York 284 AD2d 304 p. 507
- Goad v. Southern Electric International, Inc. 304 AD2d 887 at 888 p. 507
- Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Electric Co. 81 NY2d 494 at 503-505 p. 507
- Weingarten v. Windsor Owners Corp. 5 AD3d 674 at 677 p. 507
- Bradley v. Morgan Stanley & Co. 21 AD3d 866 at 868 p. 507
- Shipkoski v. Watch Case Factory Associates 292 AD2d 589 at 590 p. 507
- Winegrad v. New York University Medical Center 64 NY2d 851 at 853 p. 507
- Zuckerman v. City of New York 49 NY2d 557 at 562 p. 507
- Molyneaux v. City of New York 28 AD3d 438 p. 508
- Ayotte v. Gervasio 81 NY2d 1062 at 1063 p. 508
- Penta v. Related Companies 286 AD2d 674 at 675 p. 508