Majority
Appeal from a judgment (denominated order) of the Supreme Court, Herkimer County (Michael E. Daley, J.), entered December 21, 2005 in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78. The judgment dismissed the petition.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously reversed on the law without costs and the petition is granted in part in accordance with the following memorandum: Petitioners commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding against respondent Town of Newport (Town), the members of its Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA), and Humpf Sanitation, LLC (Humpf), the owner of two parcels of property adjacent to petitioners’ property. Petitioners sought, inter alia, to annul the determination of the ZBA confirming the Town Building Code Enforcement Officer’s issuance of a building permit allowing Humpf to construct a new 18,000-square-foot, 35-foot-high “Sanitation/Transfer Station” on one of the two parcels. In confirming the issuance of the building permit, the ZBA agreed with the determination of the Building Code Enforcement Officer that Humpf was legally continuing, and not illegally expanding, a prior nonconforming use of that parcel as a solid waste transfer facility.
Supreme Court erred in dismissing the petition in its entirety inasmuch as the construction of the new building by Humpf for
Here, there is substantial evidence in the record that the parcel not designated for construction of the building was devoted to use for the hauling and transfer of solid waste when the zoning ordinance was enacted, in December 1978. We conclude, however, that the ZBA’s determination that the parcel upon which the building was constructed was then so used lacks a rational basis and is not supported by substantial evidence (see Town of Canaan v S.C.L. Form Co., Inc., 32 AD3d 619 [2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 714 [2006]; Matter of Watral v Scheyer, 223 AD2d 711 , 712 [1996]; see generally Toys “R” Us, 89 NY2d at 423 ) and, indeed, we note that Humpfs predecessor in interest did not purchase that parcel until 1986. In any event, Humpf’s building does not meet the definition of a “NonConforming Building” under the zoning ordinance, which requires that the building have “lawfully existed at the time [of the] enactment of this ordinance” (Town of Newport Zoning Ordinance, art II, § 3). Moreover, under common-law principles, the construction of a building to enclose even a valid nonconforming use previously conducted outdoors would result in an unlawful expansion or intensification of such use (see Matter of Saladino v Fernan, 204 AD2d 554 , 555 [1994]; see also Matter of
Cases cited
- McDonald v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Town of Islip 31 AD3d 642 at 642-643 p. 1231
- P.M.S. Assets, Ltd. v. Zoning Board of Appeals 98 NY2d 683 at 685 p. 1231
- Rudolf Steiner Fellowship Foundation v. De Luccia 90 NY2d 453 at 458 p. 1231
- Toys "R" Us v. Silva 89 NY2d 411 at 417 p. 1231
- 550 Halstead Corp. v. Zoning Board of Appeals 1 NY3d 561 at 562 p. 1231
- Smith v. Board of Appeals 202 AD2d 674 at 676 p. 1231
- Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v. Weise 72 AD2d 254 at 257-258 p. 1231
- Syracuse Aggregate Corp. v. Weise 51 NY2d 278 p. 1231
- Off Shore Rest. Corp. v. Linden 30 NY2d 160 at 164 p. 1231
- Saladino v. Fernan 204 AD2d 554 at 555 p. 1231
- Mueller v. Zoning Board of Appeals 10 AD3d 687 at 690 p. 1232