Majority
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is modified on the law by denying the motion in part and reinstating the complaint, as amplified by the bill of particulars, with respect to the condition of the ground under the swing in question and as modified the order is affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for injuries sustained by her seven-year-old daughter when she fell from a swing located on a playground owned by defendant. The complaint, as amplified by the bill of particulars, alleges that defendant was negligent in “maintaining a dangerous . . . condition on the premises, to wit: packed dirt and/or soil under the swing set and an inadequate swing seat.” Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, and we conclude that Supreme Court properly granted defendant’s motion with respect to the allegedly inadequate swing seat. Defendant met its initial burden of establishing that it maintained the swing seat in a reasonably safe condition (see Lopez v Freeport Union Free School Dist., 288 AD2d 355 , 356 [2001]), and plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition with respect to the safety of the swing seat (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 , 562 [1980]).
The court erred, however, in granting that part of defendant’s motion with respect to the condition of the ground under the swing from which plaintiffs daughter fell, i.e., packed dirt and/or soil, and we therefore modify the order accordingly. Defendant failed to meet its burden of establishing as a matter of law that the ground was reasonably safe under the circumstances (see Prosser v County of Erie, 244 AD2d 942 , 943 [1997]), in part because it did not submit an expert’s affidavit addressing that issue. Even assuming that defendant met its initial burden, we conclude that plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact whether defendant breached its duty to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition by submitting her expert’s affidavit
Dissent
Plaintiff also raised an issue of fact with respect to defendant’s alleged actual or constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition of the ground under the swing by submitting the deposition testimony of defendant’s president, who admitted that the grass beneath the swing had been worn away and described the resulting surface as grass, “dirt or mud,” and “hard sand.” Thus, we conclude that “this case is not one in which summary judgment, a drastic remedy that is the procedural equivalent of a trial. . . , should be granted” (id. at 171).
All concur except Scudder, PJ., and Smith, J., who dissent in part and vote to affirm in the following memorandum.
We respectfully dissent in part. We agree with the majority that Supreme Court properly granted that part of defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint with respect to the allegedly inadequate swing seat. We do not agree, however, that there is a triable issue of fact with respect to the condition of the ground under the swing from which plaintiffs daughter fell, and we therefore would affirm the order granting defendant’s motion in its entirety. In our view, defendant met its initial burden in that respect by establishing that it maintained the playground facilities in a reasonably safe condition (see Lopez v Freeport Union Free School Dist., 288 AD2d 355 , 356 [2001]), and that it did not have actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition on the premises (see Coleman v New York City Hous. Auth., 12 AD3d 281 [2004]; Sinto v City of Long Beach, 290 AD2d 550 [2002]). Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition (see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 , 562 [1980]). We note in particular that, although the affidavit of plaintiff’s expert stated that hard-packed dirt surfaces are not recommended for swings, the expert cited only to the guidelines issued by the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission for that proposition, and those guidelines “are neither mandatory nor intended to be the exclusive standards for playground safety” (Merson v Syosset
In any event, even assuming, arguendo, that there was a dangerous condition, we conclude that plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether defendant created that condition (see Collins v Laro Serv. Sys. of N.Y., Inc., 36 AD3d 746 [2007]; Kelly v Berberich, 36 AD3d 475 , 476-477 [2007]), or had actual or constructive notice of it (see Coleman, 12 AD3d 281 [2004]; see generally Gordon v American Museum of Natural History, 67 NY2d 836 , 837-838 [1986]). Present—Scudder, EJ., Martoche, Smith, Centra and Peradotto, JJ.
Cases cited
- Zuckerman v. City of New York 49 NY2d 557 at 562 p. 910, p. 911
- Lugo v. LJN Toys, Ltd. 146 AD2d 168 at 170 p. 911
- Coleman v. New York City Housing Authority 12 AD3d 281 p. 911, p. 912
- Sinto v. City of Long Beach 290 AD2d 550 p. 911
- Merson v. Syosset Central School District 286 AD2d 668 at 670 p. 912
- Soldano v. Bayport-Blue Point Union Free School District 29 AD3d 891 p. 912
- McCarthy v. State of New York 167 AD2d 516 at 517 p. 912
- Capotosto v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Centre 2 AD3d 384 at 386 p. 912
- Collins v. Laro Service System of New York, Inc. 36 AD3d 746 p. 912
- Kelly v. Berberich 36 AD3d 475 at 476-477 p. 912
- Gordon v. American Museum of Natural History 67 NY2d 836 at 837-838 p. 912