Majority
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that the trial court restricted his ability to present a defense by improperly curtailing his cross-examination of a prosecution witness, and precluding him from testifying regarding the witness’s prior bad acts and evidence of third-party culpability. We disagree. The trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in limiting the defense counsel’s cross-examination of the witness as to prior bad acts because counsel failed to establish a good-faith basis in fact for this inquiry (see People v Kass, 25 NY2d 123 , 125-126 [1969]; People v Duffy, 36 NY2d 258 , 262 [1975]; People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241 [1969], cert denied 396 US 846 [1969]; People v Jones, 173 AD2d 735 [1991]; People v Dellarocco, 115 AD2d 904 [1985]). Moreover, the trial court providently exercised its discretion in excluding evidence that another party may have committed the crime for which the defendant was being tried. That evidence was purely speculative in nature and would have caused undue delay, prejudice, and confusion (see People v Schulz, 4 NY3d 521 , 528 [2005]; People v Primo, 96 NY2d 351 , 356-357 [2001]; People v Paixao, 23 AD3d 677 [2005]). Since the defendant never objected to the exclusion of this evidence on any constitutional ground, his constitutional claims with respect to the trial court’s rulings on these matters are unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Angelo, 88 NY2d 217 , 222 [1996]; People v Stephens, 84 NY2d 990 , 992 [1994]), and we decline to review them in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction.
The defendant’s contention that the trial court’s refusal to grant him adjournments to obtain the criminal records of two of the People’s witnesses violated his constitutional right to due process is without merit. Since the defendant was made aware of the witnesses’ prior criminal histories and used them for impeachment purposes, he was not prejudiced by the denial of his requests for adjournments (see People v Osborne, 91 NY2d 827 , 828 [1997]; see also People v Lane, 221 AD2d 371 [1995]).
Testimony concerning a prior uncharged crime was properly admitted since it was relevant to the issues of the defendant’s intent and motive, and its probative value outweighed its potential for prejudice (see People v Alvino, 71 NY2d 233 , 242 [1987]; People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 , 293-294 [1901]; People v
The defendant’s remaining contentions regarding a prosecution witness’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the admission of the codefendant’s grand jury testimony, the prosecutor’s alleged transgression of the Molineux ruling, and the failure of the court to give limiting instructions regarding the purpose for which the uncharged crime evidence was received, are unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]), and we decline to review them in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction. Schmidt, J.P., Rivera, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- People v. Kass 25 NY2d 123 at 125-126 p. 608
- People v. Duffy 36 NY2d 258 at 262 p. 608
- People v. Schwartzman 24 NY2d 241 p. 608
- People v. Jones 173 AD2d 735 p. 608
- People v. Dellarocco 115 AD2d 904 p. 608
- People v. Schulz 4 NY3d 521 at 528 p. 608
- People v. Primo 96 NY2d 351 at 356-357 p. 608
- People v. Angelo 88 NY2d 217 at 222 p. 608
- People v. Stephens 84 NY2d 990 at 992 p. 608
- People v. Osborne 91 NY2d 827 at 828 p. 608
- People v. Alvino 71 NY2d 233 at 242 p. 608
- People v. Molineux 168 NY 264 at 293-294 p. 608
- People v. Tarver 2 AD3d 968 p. 609
- People v. Ventimiglia 52 NY2d 350 at 362 p. 609
- People v. Garing 37 AD3d 849 p. 609