Majority
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Even though a statement may otherwise be defamatory, it is protected by a qualified privilege where the communication is made to persons who have some common interest in the subject matter (see Foster v Churchill, 87 NY2d 744 , 751 [1996]; Liberman v Gelstein, 80 NY2d 429 , 437 [1992]). Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the allegedly defamatory statements were protected by a qualified privilege and, in opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the qualified privilege applied (see Liberman v Gelstein, 80 NY2d 429 [1992]). Accordingly, the court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Fisher, J.E, Angiolillo, Balkin and Leventhal, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Foster v. Churchill 87 NY2d 744 at 751 p. 626
- Liberman v. Gelstein 80 NY2d 429 at 437 p. 626