Majority
Contrary to the Estate’s contention, the stipulation entered into by the plaintiff and the decedent prior to her death did not constitute a waiver of the plaintiffs interest in the Plan. The stipulation did not expressly reference the Plan, and the general release language contained therein was insufficient to effectuate a valid waiver (see Eredics v Chase Manhattan Bank, 100 NY2d 106 , 112-113 [2003]; Storozynski v Storozynski, 10 AD3d 419 [2004]; cf. Silber v Silber, 99 NY2d 395 , 404 [2003], cert denied 540 US 817 [2003]; Valentin v New York City Police Pension Fund, 16 AD3d 145 [2005]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, dismissed the counterclaims asserted by the Estate, declared that the plaintiff is the primary beneficiary under the Plan, and directed Pathmark to deliver the corpus of the Plan to the plaintiff.'
The Estate’s remaining contention is without merit. Skelos, J.P., Lifson, Santucci and Balkin, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Storozynski v. Storozynski 10 AD3d 419 p. 760
- Eredics v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. 100 NY2d 106 at 112-113 p. 760
- Silber v. Silber 99 NY2d 395 at 404 p. 760
- Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co. 540 US 817 p. 760
- Valentin v. New York City Police Pension Fund 16 AD3d 145 p. 760