Majority
“Generally, a snow removal contractor’s contractual obligation, standing alone, will not give rise to tort liability in favor of third parties unless: (1) the snow removal contractor, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of its duties, launched a force or instrument of harm; (2i the plaintiff detrimentally relied on the continued performance of the snow removal contractor’s duties; or (3) the snow removal contractor has entirely displaced the owner’s duty to maintain the premises safely” (Castro v Maple Run Condominium Assn., 41 AD3d 412 , 413 [2007]; see Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136 , 140 [2002]).
The Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the motion of S & S which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it. S & S made a prima facie showing that its contract to provide snow removal services was not comprehensive and exclusive (see Laitimore v First Mineola Co., 60 AD3d 639 , 642-643 [2009]; Linarello v Colin
The Supreme Court also should have granted that branch of the motion of S & S which was for summary judgment dismissing the cross claims. S & S established, prima facie, that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the common-law indemnification claim by demonstrating that the plaintiff s accident was not due solely to its negligent performance or nonperformance of an act solely within its province (see Roach v AVR Realty Co., LLC, 41 AD3d 821 , 824 [2007]; Murphy v M.B. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 280 AD2d 457 [2001]; Oppenheim v One School St. Professional Corp., 263 AD2d 472 , 473 [1999]; Keshavarz v Murphy, 242 AD2d 680 [1997]). In opposition, Bridgeport failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Furthermore, in opposition to the prima facie showing by S & S that it was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the contribution claim, Bridgeport failed to demonstrate either that S & S owed Bridgeport a duty of care independent of its contractual obligations, or that S & S owed the plaintiff a duty of care (see Wheaton v East End Commons Assoc., 50 AD3d at 678 ; Roach v AVR Realty Co., LLC., 41 AD3d at 824 ; Baratta v Home Depot USA, 303 AD2d 434 , 435 [2003]). The Supreme Court also should have granted that branch of S & S’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the contractual indemnification claim, since the agreement between Bridgeport and S & S contained no express indemnification provisions, and an indemnification clause could not be implied from the language of that agreement (see generally Hooper Assoc. v AGS Computers, 74 NY2d 487 , 491-492 [1989]; Drzewinski v Atlantic Scaffold & Ladder Co., 70 NY2d 774 , 777 [1987]; Canela v TLH 140 Perry St., LLC, 47 AD3d 743 , 744 [2008]). Skelos, J.P., Eng, Belen and Austin, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Castro v. Maple Run Condominium Ass'n 41 AD3d 412 at 413 p. 971
- Espinal v. Melville Snow Contractors, Inc. 98 NY2d 136 at 140 p. 971
- Lattimore v. First Mineola Co. 60 AD3d 639 at 642-643 p. 971
- Linarello v. Colin Service Systems, Inc. 31 AD3d 396 p. 972
- Wheaton v. East End Commons Associates, LLC 50 AD3d 675 p. 972
- Murphy v. M.B. Real Estate Development Corp. 280 AD2d 457 p. 972
- Pavlovich v. Wade Associates, Inc. 274 AD2d 382 p. 972
- Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital 68 NY2d 320 at 324 p. 972
- Roach v. AVR Realty Co. 41 AD3d 821 at 824 p. 972
- Keshavarz v. Murphy 242 AD2d 680 p. 972
- Baratta v. Home Depot USA, Inc. 303 AD2d 434 at 435 p. 972
- Hooper Associates Ltd. v. AGS Computers, Inc. 74 NY2d 487 at 491-492 p. 972
- Richard Drzewinski v. Atlantic Scaffold & Ladder Co. 70 NY2d 774 at 777 p. 972
- Canela v. TLH 140 Perry Street, LLC 47 AD3d 743 at 744 p. 972