Majority
Appeal from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board, filed April 13, 2009, which, among other things, ruled that claimant voluntarily withdrew from the labor market.
In March 2006, claimant sustained a work-related injury to her head, neck and back while working as a cleaner in one of the employer’s stores when, as she stood up after bending over to pick trash off the floor, she banged her head on a sprinkler valve. Claimant sustained further injury to her lower back while getting on an examination table for an independent medical examination evaluation. Following a hearing, a workers’ compensation law judge determined that claimant was permanently partially markedly disabled and awarded workers’ compensation benefits. Upon review, the Workers’ Compensation Board agreed that claimant suffered a permanent partial disability, but found that claimant voluntarily withdrew from the labor market and, accordingly, that she is not entitled to receive benefits past the date of her November 2008 hearing. On claimant’s appeal, we now affirm.
“Whether a claimant has voluntarily withdrawn from the labor market is an issue of fact for the Board to resolve, and its resolution of that issue will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence in the record” (Matter of Magerko v Edwin B. Stimpson Co., Inc., 67 AD3d 1267 , 1268 [2009] [citation omitted]; see Matter of VanWinkle v Harden Furniture, 63 AD3d 1360 , 1361 [2009]). In situations such as this, where the claimant has a permanent partial disability, the Board may consider whether the claimant has “demonstrate [d] attachment to the labor market with evidence of a search for employment within medical restrictions” when determining whether the claimant’s separation from the labor market was voluntary (Matter of Peck v James Sq. Nursing Home, 34 AD3d 1033 , 1034 [2006]; see Burns v Varriale, 9 NY3d 207 , 216 [2007]; Matter of Rothe v United Med. Assoc., 18 AD3d 1093 , 1094 [2005]; Matter of Capezzuti v Glens Falls Hosp., 282 AD2d 808 , 809-810 [2001]).
Claimant’s contention that she was entitled to a presumption that her earning capacity was reduced by her disability is misplaced as the cases upon which she relies involve situations where the threshold finding of involuntary separation had already been made (see Matter of Laing v Maryhaven Ctr. of Hope, 39 AD3d at 1126 ; cf. Matter of Leeber v LILCO, 29 AD3d 1198 , 1199 [2006]; Matter of Pittman v ABM Indus., Inc., 24 AD3d 1056 , 1057 [2005]; Matter of Jiminez v Waldbaums, 9 AD3d 99 , 100-101 [2004]).
Lahtinen, Kavanagh, Stein and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the decision is affirmed, without costs.
Cases cited
- Magerko v. Edwin B. Stimpson Co. 67 AD3d 1267 at 1268 p. 1126
- Claim of VanWinkle v. Harden Furniture 63 AD3d 1360 at 1361 p. 1126
- Claim of Peck v. James Square Nursing Home 34 AD3d 1033 at 1034 p. 1126
- Burns v. Varriale 9 NY3d 207 at 216 p. 1126
- Capezzuti v. Glens Falls Hospital 282 AD2d 808 at 809-810 p. 1126
- Claim of Sanchez v. Consolidated Edison Co. 40 AD3d 1153 at 1154 p. 1127
- Claim of Laing v. Maryhaven Center of Hope 39 AD3d 1125 at 1126 p. 1127
- Claim of Leeber v. LILCO 29 AD3d 1198 at 1199 p. 1127
- Pittman v. ABM Industries, Inc. 24 AD3d 1056 at 1057 p. 1127
- Claim of Jiminez v. Waldbaums 9 AD3d 99 at 100-101 p. 1127