Majority
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law and as a matter of discretion, with costs, the motion to vacate is denied, and the order dated July 11, 2003, is reinstated.
A party seeking to vacate a default in appearing or answering must demonstrate a justifiable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138 , 141 [1986]). The bare allegation by the defendants’ attorney in an affirmation that the delay was caused by the defendants’ insurance carrier was insufficient to excuse the over one-year delay in answering the complaint (see Kaplinsky v Mazor, 307 AD2d 916 [2003]; Cilindrello v Rayabin, 297 AD2d 699 [2002]; Andrade v Ranginwala, 297 AD2d 691 [2002]; Warn v Seung K. Choi-Lee, 291 AD2d 490 [2002]). Furthermore, the defendants failed to demonstrate that they have a meritorious defense (see Meretskaya v Logozzo, 2 AD3d 599 [2003]; Rieman v Smith, 302 AD2d 510 [2003]; Russo v Scibetti, 298 AD2d 514 [2002]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the defendants’ motion to vacate the order. Altman, J.P., S. Miller, Schmidt, Cozier and Skelos, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v. A. C. Dutton Lumber Co. 67 NY2d 138 at 141 p. 317
- Kaplinsky v. Mazor 307 AD2d 916 p. 317
- Andrade v. Ranginwala 297 AD2d 691 p. 317
- Meretskaya v. Logozzo 2 AD3d 599 p. 317
- Rieman v. Smith 302 AD2d 510 p. 317