Majority
Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Tompkins County (Rowley, J.), entered January 11, 2010, which granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 3, to adjudicate respondent a juvenile delinquent.
Petitioner commenced this proceeding alleging that, in July 2009, while with a friend, respondent (born in 1995) recklessly lit fireworks in a large barn in the Town of Ithaca, Tompkins County, causing a fire that resulted in a total loss of the barn
Initially, we disagree with respondent that his admission to the underlying act was defective based on Family Court’s failure to comply with Family Ct Act § 321.3, specifically, that Family Court failed to establish that respondent acted recklessly when he damaged the barn. Under Family Ct Act § 321.3 (1), which governs the acceptance of an admission in juvenile delinquency proceedings, the court must, among other things, “ascertain through allocution of the respondent and his [or her] parent or other person legally responsible for his [or her] care, if present, that (a) he [or she] committed the act or acts to which he [or she] is entering an admission.” The failure to follow the statute’s mandatory and nonwaivable requirements requires reversal (see Matter of Lee S., 58 AD3d 1088 , 1089 [2009]; Matter of Joshua HH., 299 AD2d 760 , 760 [2002]). As relevant here, a person is guilty of criminal mischief in the fourth degree when he or she “[r]ecklessly damages property of another person in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars” (Penal Law § 145.00 [3]). For respondent to have acted recklessly, he must have been “aware of and consciously disregarded] a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that harm would occur through his actions (see Penal Law § 15.05 [3]). Here, we find that respondent’s admission that he and his friend lit firecrackers in the barn on the date in question together with his acknowledgment that he understood that such conduct constituted a reckless action was sufficient to support Family Court’s finding that respondent’s conduct was reckless (see Matter of Donald NN., 9 AD3d 537 , 537-538 [2004]). Furthermore, although respondent did not explicitly state that he knowingly disregarded a conscious risk, it can be sufficiently inferred from his admission (see Matter of Tucker J., 42 AD3d 765 , 766-767 [2007]; Matter of Justin ZZ., 214 AD2d 816 , 816 [1995]).
Rose, J.E, Kavanagh and McCarthy, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.
Cases cited
- In re Lee S. 58 AD3d 1088 at 1089 p. 1105
- In re Joshua HH. 299 AD2d 760 at 760 p. 1105
- In re Donald NN. 9 AD3d 537 at 537-538 p. 1105
- In re Justin ZZ. 214 AD2d 816 at 816 p. 1105
- In re Melissa VV. 26 AD3d 682 at 683 p. 1106
- In re Tjay T. 34 AD3d 1060 at 1062 p. 1106
- In re Yasin H. 31 AD3d 638 at 638 p. 1106
- In re Curtin 63 AD3d 1224 at 1225 p. 1106