Garal Wholesalers, Ltd. v. Raven Brands, Inc. — 82 A.D.3d 1041

Majority

p. 1041

Garal Wholesalers, Ltd., Appellant, v Raven Brands, Inc., Respondent, et al., Defendant.

[919 NYS2d 358]

A party seeking to vacate a default in appearing or answering and to serve a late answer must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v A.C. Dutton Lbr. Co., 67 NY2d 138 , 141 [1986]; Heidari v First Advance Funding Corp., 55 AD3d 669 [2008]; Levi v Levi, 46 AD3d 519 [2007]; 599 Ralph Ave. Dev., LLC v 799 Sterling Inc., 34 AD3d 726 [2006]; New York & Presbyt. Hosp. v Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 27 AD3d 708 [2006]). The good faith belief of the president of the defendant Raven Brands, Inc. (hereinafter Raven), that his telephone conversation with the plaintiffs

p. 1042

attorney and his subsequent letters denying the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to answer the complaint did not constitute a sufficient excuse for the default, particularly since the plaintiffs attorney responded by letter stating that Raven was in default in answering the complaint (see Tucker v Rogers, 95 AD2d 960 [1983]). Furthermore, Raven’s erroneous assumptions regarding the validity of the action and the need to defend did not constitute reasonable excuses for its default in answering and for its almost four-month delay in appearing in this action (see Yao Ping Tang v Grand Estate, LLC, 77 AD3d 822 , 823 [2010]; Awad v Severino, 122 AD2d 242 [1986]; Passalacqua v Banat, 103 AD2d 769 [1984]). Moreover, the affidavit of Raven’s president, which contained only conclusory assertions without any evidentiary support, was insufficient to establish a potentially meritorious defense to the action (see Kolajo v City of New York, 248 AD2d 512 , 513 [1998]; Peterson v Scandurra Trucking Co., 226 AD2d 691 , 692 [1996]; Lener v Club Med, 168 AD2d 433 , 435 [1990]).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied Raven’s renewed motion, in effect, inter alia, to vacate its default. Rivera, J.E, Florio, Dickerson, Hall and Roman, JJ., concur.

Cases cited

Eugene Di Lorenzo, Inc. v. A. C. Dutton Lumber Co. 67 NY2d 138 N.Y. 1986-03-27 at 141 p. 1041
Heidari v. First Advance Funding Corp. 55 AD3d 669 N.Y. App. Div. 2008-10-14 p. 1041
Levi v. Levi 46 AD3d 519 N.Y. App. Div. 2007-12-04 p. 1041
New York and Presbyterian Hospital v. Travelers Property Casualty Insurance 27 AD3d 708 N.Y. App. Div. 2006-03-28 p. 1041
Tucker v. Rogers 95 AD2d 960 N.Y. App. Div. 1983-06-23 p. 1042
Yao Ping Tang v. Grand Estate, LLC 77 AD3d 822 N.Y. App. Div. 2010-10-19 at 823 p. 1042
Kolajo v. City of New York 248 AD2d 512 N.Y. App. Div. 1998-03-16 at 513 p. 1042
Peterson v. Scandurra Trucking Co. 226 AD2d 691 N.Y. App. Div. 1996-04-29 at 692 p. 1042
Lener v. Club Med, Inc. 168 AD2d 433 N.Y. App. Div. 1990-12-03 at 435 p. 1042