Majority
In an action to recover damages for malicious prosecution, the defendants Pine Top Associates, LLC, Bob Lord, and Mauro Valentine appeal, and the defendant Stephen Brotmann
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs payable by the appellants appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
“In order for a plaintiff to maintain a civil action to recover damages for malicious prosecution, it must show: ‘(1) the commencement of a judicial proceeding against the plaintiff, (2) at the insistence of the defendant, (3) without probable cause, (4) with malice, (5) which action was terminated in favor of the plaintiff, and (6) to the plaintiffs injury’ ” (Furgang & Adwar, LLP v Fiber-Shield Indus., Inc., 55 AD3d 665 , 665 [2008], quoting Felske v Bernstein, 173 AD2d 677 , 678 [1991]; see Berman v Silver, Forrester & Schisano, 156 AD2d 624 [1989]). The prior judicial proceeding is “to the plaintiffs injury” if it resulted in interference with the plaintiffs person or property (see Purdue Frederick Co. v Steadfast Ins. Co., 40 AD3d 285 , 286 [2007]; Oceanside Enters. v Capobianco, 146 AD2d 685 [1989]). A motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) “will fail if, taking all facts alleged as true and according them every possible inference favorable to the plaintiff, ‘the complaint states in some recognizable form any cause of action known to our law’ ” (Sheroff v Dreyfus Corp., 50 AD3d 877 , 877-878 [2008], quoting Shaya B. Pac., LLC v Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, 38 AD3d 34 , 38 [2006]). Under the circumstances alleged herein, the Supreme Court properly concluded that the complaint adequately stated a cause of action alleging malicious prosecution. Moreover, contrary to the defendants’ contention, the complaint does not sound only in a cause of action alleging slander of title (see Fink v Shawangunk Conservancy, Inc., 15 AD3d 754 , 756 [2005]; Alexander v Scott, 286 AD2d 692 , 693 [2001]; Sopher v Martin, 243 AD2d 459 , 462 [1997]; Brown v Bethlehem Terrace Assoc., 136 AD2d 222 , 224 [1988]; see also Casa de Meadows Inc. [Cayman Is.] v Zaman, 76 AD3d 917 , 922 [2010]; Pelc v Berg, 68 AD3d 1672 , 1674 [2009]; 35-45 May Assoc. v Mayloc Assoc., 162 AD2d 389 , 389-390 [1990]; cf. Plot Realty LLC v DeSilva, 45 AD3d 312 [2007]).
The Supreme Court also properly denied those branches of the defendants’ separate motions which sought to dismiss the complaint as time-barred (see CPLR 3211 [a] [5]). A malicious
The defendants’ remaining contentions are improperly raised for the first time on appeal and, in any event, are without merit. Rivera, J.P., Angiolillo, Eng and Sgroi, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Furgang & Adwar, LLP v. Fiber-Shield Industries, Inc. 55 AD3d 665 at 665 p. 690
- Felske v. Bernstein 173 AD2d 677 at 678 p. 690
- Berman v. Forrester 156 AD2d 624 p. 690
- Purdue Frederick Co. v. Steadfast Insurance 40 AD3d 285 at 286 p. 690
- Oceanside Enterprises, Inc. v. Capobianco 146 AD2d 685 p. 690, p. 691
- Sheroff v. Dreyfus Corp. 50 AD3d 877 at 877-878 p. 690
- Shaya B. Pacific, LLC v. Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP 38 AD3d 34 at 38 p. 690
- Fink v. Shawangunk Conservancy, Inc. 15 AD3d 754 at 756 p. 690
- Brown v. Bethlehem Terrace Associates 136 AD2d 222 at 224 p. 690
- Pelc v. Berg 68 AD3d 1672 at 1674 p. 690
- 35-45 May Associates v. Mayloc Associates 162 AD2d 389 at 389-390 p. 690