Majority
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Melvin L. Schweitzer, J.), entered September 1, 2010, which granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs.
Contrary to plaintiffs argument, the contested language of article 9 is susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation (see Riverside S. Planning Corp. v CRP/Extell Riverside, L.P., 60 AD3d 61 , 67 [2008] [“clear contractual language does not become ambiguous simply because the parties . . . argue different interpretations”], affd 13 NY3d 398 [2009]). We also reject plaintiffs argument that defendant was required to show it was prejudiced by plaintiffs failure to provide notice of the asserted third-party claims; the cited provision of article 9 refers to prejudice arising from late notice, not the absence of any notice whatsoever. Concur — Andrias, J.E, Sweeny, Catterson, Renwick and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.
Cases cited
- MHR Capital Partners LP v. Presstek, Inc. 12 NY3d 640 at 645 p. 465
- Admiral Insurance v. Marriott International, Inc. 79 AD3d 572 at 573 p. 465
- Riverside South Planning Corp. v. CRP/Extell Riverside 60 AD3d 61 at 67 p. 465
- Riverside South Planning Corp. v. CRP/Extell Riverside, L.P. 13 NY3d 398 p. 465