Subdivisions, Inc. v. Town of Sullivan

The relevant facts are more fully set forth in our prior decision (Subdivisions, Inc. v Town of Sullivan, 75 AD3d 978 [2010]). Briefly, this declaratory judgment action involves a protracted zoning dispute regarding plaintiffs’ entitlement to nonconforming use status for an 80-acre parcel of land (hereinafter the subject parcel) owned by plaintiff Subdivisions, Inc. and located on County Route 23, commonly known as Quarry Road, in the Town of Sullivan, Madison County. Historically, Subdivisions’ predecessors in interest mined the subject parcel, which lies on the east side of Quarry Road, as well as another parcel, which lies on the west side of Quarry Road. Although the western parcel has been mined continuously since the 1800s, mining operations on the subject parcel ceased around the turn of the century.

In 2004, plaintiff J.B. Quarry, Inc. applied for a mining permit for the subject parcel, which was granted by the Department of Environmental Conservation in 2006. In the midst of various (and ultimately unsuccessful) CPLR article 78 proceedings, plaintiffs commenced this declaratory judgment action seeking, among other things, a declaration that they were entitled to nonconforming use status for the subject parcel and, hence, defendant Town of Sullivan’s zoning regulations governing mining operations were void as against them. Following joinder of issue, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, the Town cross-moved to dismiss and defendant Town of Sullivan Zoning Board of Appeals moved to intervene. Supreme Court granted the motion to intervene but otherwise denied the requested relief. Upon plaintiffs’ appeal, we affirmed.

Following our decision, defendants separately moved to dismiss this action, each asserting that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Supreme Court denied their respective motions and scheduled a fact-finding hearing concluding, among other things, that plaintiffs demonstrated an exception to the exhaustion requirement. This appeal by defendants ensued.^[1]

The crux of defendants’ argument on appeal is that the underlying declaratory judgment action should be dismissed based upon plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust their administrative

As a starting point, we note that “[t]he requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies assumes that adequate relief may be obtained under the [challenged zoning] ordinance” (Polak v Kavanah, 48 AD2d 840 , 840 [1975]) — an assumption that is very much in doubt in the matter now before us. Further, “[a]lthough a court may dismiss a declaratory judgment action in a proper exercise of discretion, the mere existence of other adequate remedies does not mandate dismissal” (Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 87 NY2d 136 , 140-141 [1995] [emphasis added]; see CPLR 3001) and, given the particular facts of this case, we perceive no abuse of Supreme Court’s discretion here. Finally, although plaintiffs’ entitlement to nonconforming use status ultimately entails a factual determination — namely, whether plaintiffs can “establish specific actions constituting an overt manifestation of [their] intent to utilize the [subject] property for the ascribed purpose at the time the [Town’s] zoning ordinance became effective” (Bu ffalo Crushed Stone, Inc. v Town of Cheektowaga, 13 NY3d 88 , 98 [2009]), we agree with Supreme Court that such an inquiry is best addressed in the context of a declaratory judgment action. Thus, for these reasons alone, we would affirm Supreme Court’s order.

However, even accepting, for the sake of argument, that defendants have appropriately characterized the nature of the relief sought by plaintiffs, that the purported certificate of nonconformity is a document actually contemplated by the Town’s zoning law and for which plaintiffs indeed could apply^[2] and further, that there are certain — albeit unidentified — provi