People v. Bivens

The decision to permit a defendant to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty rests within the sound discretion of the court (see People v Seeber, 4 NY3d 780 [2005]; People v Bruno, 73 AD3d 941 [2010]; People v Pooler, 58 AD3d 757 [2009]; People v Mann, 32 AD3d 865 [2006]; People v Kucharczyk, 15 AD3d 595 [2005]), and this determination generally will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of discretion (see People v Bruno, 73 AD3d at 941 ; People v Pooler, 58 AD3d at 757 ; People v DeLeon, 40 AD3d 1008 [2007]). Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying, without a hearing, his pro se motion to vacate his plea of guilty (see People v Doherty, 134 AD2d 513 [1987]).

The defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered his negotiated plea of guilty with the assistance of competent counsel, in exchange for a favorable sentence promise (see People v Bruno, 73 AD3d at 941 ; People v Pooler, 58 AD3d at 757 ; People v Cummings, 53 AD3d 587 [2008]). The defendant’s unsubstantiated assertions of innocence at the time of sentencing were insufficient to justify granting his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty (see People v Bruno, 73 AD3d at 941 ; People v Cummings, 53 AD3d at 587 ).