Majority
A party seeking to vacate a default must establish a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense (see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Matter of Dellagatta v McGillicuddy, 31 AD3d 549 , 550 [2006]; Matter of Oliphant v Oliphant, 21 AD3d 376 [2005]; Matter of Butterworth v Sperber, 6 AD3d 530 [2004]). However, the general rule with respect to opening defaults in civil actions “is not to be rigorously applied to cases involving child custody” (Gorsky v Gorsky, 148 AD2d 674 , 674 [1989]; see Ito v Ito, 73 AD3d 983 [2010]; D’Alleva v D’Alleva, 127 AD2d 732 , 734 [1987]).
Under the circumstances presented, and recognizing that the law favors resolution on the merits in child custody proceedings (see Matter of Lee v Morgan, 67 AD3d 681 [2009]; Matter of Pinto v Putnam County Support Collection Unit, 295 AD2d 350 , 351 [2002]; Matter of Tauber v Tauber, 152 AD2d 674 [1989]), the Family Court should have granted the mother’s motion to
Cases cited
- Dellagatta v. McGillicuddy 31 AD3d 549 at 550 p. 733
- Gorsky v. Gorsky 148 AD2d 674 at 674 p. 733
- Ito v. Ito 73 AD3d 983 p. 733
- D'Alleva v. D'Alleva 127 AD2d 732 at 734 p. 733
- Lee v. Morgan 67 AD3d 681 p. 733
- Tauber v. Tauber 152 AD2d 674 p. 733