Majority
Paradise submitted evidence demonstrating that Cramden was an independent contractor over which it only exercised incidental control. Thus, Paradise established, prima facie, that it could not be held vicariously liable for any negligence of Cramden or its employee, Zwerin (see Kleeman v Rheingold, 81 NY2d 270 , 273 [1993]; Rosenberg v Equitable Life Assur. Socy. of U.S., 79 NY2d 663 , 668 [1992]; Chuchuca v Chuchuca, 67 AD3d 948 , 950 [2009]). In opposition, the appellants failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 , 324 [1986]; cf. Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494 , 506 [1993]). Further, the appellants failed to demonstrate that discovery was necessary to oppose the motion (see CPLR 3212 [f|; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 , 562 [1980]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of Paradise’s motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it by Marcellus and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it by Montour and Touissant. Rivera, J.E, Angiolillo, Helen and Roman, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Kleeman v. Rheingold 81 NY2d 270 at 273 p. 798
- Rosenberg v. Equitable Life Assurance Society 79 NY2d 663 at 668 p. 798
- Chuchuca v. Chuchuca 67 AD3d 948 at 950 p. 798
- Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital 68 NY2d 320 at 324 p. 798
- Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Electric Co. 81 NY2d 494 at 506 p. 798
- Zuckerman v. City of New York 49 NY2d 557 at 562 p. 798