Majority
The court, which instructed the jury that the element of intent may be inferred from circumstances, properly declined to deliver a full circumstantial evidence charge containing language about exclusion of alternative reasonable hypotheses of innocence. No such instruction was necessary, because the case was based on both direct and circumstantial evidence (see People v Roldan, 88 NY2d 826 [1996]; People v Daddona, 81 NY2d 990 [1993]). Defendant’s guilt was established through direct evidence of his conduct, and the inference of accessorial liability could be drawn from that conduct. Concur — Mazzarelli, J.E, Andrias, Saxe, Freedman and Román, JJ.
Cases cited
- People v. Danielson 9 NY3d 342 at 348-349 p. 490
- People v. Roldan 88 NY2d 826 p. 490