Majority
Family Court Act § 438 (a) provides that in any proceeding under Family Court Act article 4, “the court may allow counsel fees at any stage of the proceeding, to the attorney representing
Considering all of the circumstances of this case, including that the protracted nature of this dispute and the extent of the services required to deal with it were attributable to the actions and inactions of the father and his former counsel, the attorney’s fee awarded to the mother was not an improvident exercise of discretion.
The father’s remaining contentions either are without merit or are not properly before this Court, as they were not raised in his objections to the Support Magistrate’s order entered June 21, 2010 (see Matter of Tosques v Ponyicky, 89 AD3d 1097 [2011]; Matter of Feng Lucy Luo v Yang, 89 AD3d 946 [2011]; Matter of Hicks v Hicks, 87 AD3d 1143 , 1143-1144 [2011]). Rivera, J.E, Eng, Lott and Sgroi, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Nieves-Ford v. Gordon 47 AD3d 936 at 937 p. 867
- Wade v. Smith 86 AD3d 577 at 578 p. 867
- Dinhofer v. Zabezhanskaya 79 AD3d 1039 at 1040 p. 867
- Tosques v. Ponyicky 89 AD3d 1097 p. 867
- Feng Lucy Luo v. Yang 89 AD3d 946 p. 867
- Hicks v. Hicks 87 AD3d 1143 at 1143-1144 p. 867