Majority
We agree, however, with the mother’s contention that the Family Court erred in directing that “[n]o petition requesting additional visitation by the mother shall be accepted by the court until the [attorney for the children] has approved of such a request” (see Matter of Mackenzie M. v Mary U., 38 AD3d 1249 , 1250 [2007]; Matter of Shreve v Shreve, 229 AD2d 1005 , 1006 [1996]). We note that the alternatives to that provision proposed by the father and the attorney for the children in their respective briefs also would be improper (see generally Matter of Williams v O’Toole, 4 AD3d 371 , 372 [2004]; Matter of Adam H., 195 AD2d 1074 , 1075 [1993]; cf. Vogelgesang v Vogelgesang, 71 AD3d 1132 , 1134 [2010]). Mastro, A.EJ, Angiolillo, Eng and Cohen, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Arduino v. Ayuso 70 AD3d 682 p. 781
- Perez v. Martinez 52 AD3d 518 at 519 p. 781
- Brooks v. Brooks 255 AD2d 382 at 383 p. 781
- Goldman v. Goldman 201 AD2d 860 at 862 p. 781
- Richmond v. Perez 38 AD3d 782 at 783-784 p. 781
- Peluso v. Kasun 78 AD3d 950 at 950-951 p. 781
- Weinschneider v. Weinschneider 73 AD3d 1194 at 1195 p. 781
- Shreve v. Shreve 229 AD2d 1005 at 1006 p. 781
- Williams v. O'Toole 4 AD3d 371 at 372 p. 781
- In re Adam H. 195 AD2d 1074 at 1075 p. 781