Majority
The nature of the sanction for disobedience regarding court-ordered disclosure generally lies within the discretion of the IAS court (see Emmitt v City of New York, 66 AD3d 504 [2009]). Moreover, since there is a strong preference that matters be decided on their merits (see Catarine v Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 290 AD2d 213 [2002]), we agree with the motion court that the “ultimate penalty” of striking the answer was unwarranted, at least up to this point (cf. Elias v City of New York, 87 AD3d 513 , 517 [2011]). However, the court improvidently exercised that discretion in declining to impose a stronger sanction on defendant City for its dilatory conduct.
In the instant case, the City’s unexcused conduct and pattern of delay in timely serving discovery warrants a monetary sanction as noted above (see Figdor v City of New York, 33 AD3d 560 [2006]; Anonymous v High School for Envtl. Studies, 32 AD3d 353 [2006]). This sanction should deter the City from “continuing its cavalier noncompliance with court-ordered discovery” (Elias, 87 AD3d at 517 ). Concur — Mazzarelli, J.P., Catterson, DeGrasse, Richter and Manzanet-Daniels, JJ.
Cases cited
- Catarine v. Beth Israel Medical Center 290 AD2d 213 p. 781
- Elias v. City of New York 87 AD3d 513 at 517 p. 781
- Figdor v. City of New York 33 AD3d 560 p. 781
- Anonymous v. High School for Environmental Studies 32 AD3d 353 p. 781