Majority
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Holder, J.), rendered April 27, 2010, convicting him of rape in the second degree (six counts), criminal sexual act in the second degree (five counts), and endangering the welfare of a child, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The court providently exercised its discretion in allowing the People to put on an expert to testify about the concept of “blending,” which occurs when a child or adolescent sexual abuse victim and a perpetrator perform the same acts more than once in the same place and which makes it difficult for an adolescent to sequentially separate the distinct elements of what occurred. The court also providently exercised its discretion in permitting the People’s expert to explain that a child or adolescent sexual abuse victim might delay his or her outcry as to the abuse. Such testimony explained behaviors of sexual abuse victims that jurors might not be expected to understand (see People v Spicola, 16 NY3d 441 , 462-463 [2011], cert denied 565 US —, 132 S Ct 400 [2011]; People v Keindl, 68 NY2d at 422 ).
The defendant’s claim that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his guilt is only partially preserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Smith, 23 AD3d 416 [2005]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to prove the defendant’s guilt of all the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 , 348 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383 [2004], cert denied 542 US 946 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490 , 495 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record herein, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt as to all the crimes was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).
The defendant argues that some of the comments made by the prosecutor during summation deprived him of his right to a fair trial. However, most of the challenged comments constituted fair comment on the evidence, were permissible rhetorical comment, or were responsive to defense counsel’s summation (see People v Gillespie, 36 AD3d 626 , 627 [2007]; People v McHarris, 297 AD2d 824 , 825 [2002]). To the extent that any of the comments were improper, they were not so flagrant or pervasive as to deny the defendant a fair trial and, thus, reversal is not warranted (see People v Rogers, 92 AD3d 903 [2012]; People v Banyan, 60 AD3d 861 [2009]).
The defendant’s remaining contentions are without merit. Dillon, J.P., Eng, Austin and Sgroi, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- People v. Keindl 68 NY2d 410 at 419 p. 528
- People v. Morris 61 NY2d 290 at 293-296 p. 528
- People v. Weekes 71 AD3d 1065 p. 528
- People v. Beauchamp 74 NY2d 639 p. 528
- People v. Jiminez 239 AD2d 360 p. 528
- People v. Spicola 16 NY3d 441 at 462-463 p. 528
- People v. Smith 23 AD3d 416 p. 528
- People v. Contes 60 NY2d 620 p. 528
- People v. Danielson 9 NY3d 342 at 348 p. 528
- Middleton v. McNeil 542 US 946 p. 528
- People v. Bleakley 69 NY2d 490 at 495 p. 528
- People v. Romero 7 NY3d 633 p. 528
- People v. Prado 4 NY3d 725 at 726 p. 529
- People v. Bedell 84 AD3d 1733 p. 529
- People v. White 81 AD3d 1039 p. 529
- People v. Darling 276 AD2d 922 p. 529
- People v. Casey 61 AD3d 1011 at 1014 p. 529
- People v. Love 307 AD2d 528 at 532 p. 529
- People v. Maxam 301 AD2d 791 at 793 p. 529
- People v. Rogers 92 AD3d 903 p. 529