Majority
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Latella, J.), rendered September 15, 2010, convicting him of burglary in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant’s contention that the Supreme Court erred in denying his Batson application (see Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79 , 96 [1986]) regarding the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to three prospective Latino jurors is without merit. “It is incumbent upon a party making a Batson challenge to articulate and develop all of the grounds supporting the claim, both factual and legal, during the colloquy in which the objec
The defendant’s contention that the Supreme Court erred when it reinstructed the jury on the elements of the crimes charged without reinstructing it on the evidentiary significance of a broken shower rod, if any, is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Wright, 90 AD3d 679 , 679-680 [2011]; People v Brown, 71 AD3d 1043 , 1044 [2010]). In any event, the contention is without merit, as the jury did not request reinstruction regarding the evidentiary nature of the shower rod (see People v Allen, 69 NY2d 915 , 916 [1987]; People v Francis, 262 AD2d 581 [1999]).
Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the Supreme Court did not err when it reinstructed the jury on the elements of the crimes charged without reinstructing it on intoxication, as the jury did not request reinstruction on intoxication (see People v Allen, 69 NY2d at 916 ; People v Francis, 262 AD2d at 581 ). The Supreme Court’s response to the jury’s request was meaningful (see CPL 310.30).
The defendant’s contention that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt by legally sufficient evidence because his intoxication rendered him incapable of forming the requisite criminal intent is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05 [2]; People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484 , 492 [2008]; People v Alston, 42 AD3d 468 , 469 [2007]). “In any event, the general rule is that an intoxicated person can form the requisite criminal intent to commit a crime, and it is for the trier of fact to decide if the extent of the intoxication acted to negate the element of intent” (People v Alston, 42 AD3d at 469 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Penal Law § 15.25). Viewing the evidence in the
Cases cited
- Batson v. Kentucky 476 US 79 at 96 p. 539
- People v. Scott 70 AD3d 977 at 977 p. 540
- People v. James 99 NY2d 264 at 270 p. 540
- People v. Hecker 15 NY3d 625 at 651 p. 540
- People v. Childress 81 NY2d 263 at 268 p. 540
- People v. Wright 90 AD3d 679 at 679-680 p. 540
- People v. Allen 69 NY2d 915 at 916 p. 540
- People v. Hawkins 11 NY3d 484 at 492 p. 540
- People v. Alston 42 AD3d 468 at 469 p. 540
- People v. Contes 60 NY2d 620 at 621 p. 541
- People v. Dorst 194 AD2d 622 at 622 p. 541
- People v. Romero 7 NY3d 633 at 644-645 p. 541