Majority
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bunyan, J.), entered April 25, 2011, which, upon a jury verdict in favor of the defendant and against her on the issue of liability, and upon the denial of her motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside the verdict and for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, to set aside the verdict as contrary to the weight of the evidence and for a new trial, is in favor of the defendant and against her, dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff allegedly was injured when she tripped and fell on a defect in the sidewalk abutting premises owned by the defendant. Following a jury trial on the issue of liability, the jury found that the defendant was not negligent, and judgment was entered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, dismissing the complaint.
For a reviewing court to determine that a jury’s verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence, it must conclude that there is “simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences” by which the jury could have rationally reached its verdict “on the basis of the evidence presented at trial” (Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493 , 499 [1978]; see Szczerbiak v Pilat, 90 NY2d 553 , 556 [1997]; Guclu v 900 Eighth Ave. Condominium, LLC, 81 AD3d 592 , 592 [2011]). In addition, a jury verdict should not be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence unless the jury could not have reached the verdict by any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Lolik v Big V Supermarkets, 86 NY2d 744 , 746 [1995]; Chavanne v BZL Cleaning Solution, Inc., 84 AD3d 852 , 853 [2011]; Piazza v Corporate Bldrs. Group, Inc., 73 AD3d 1006 , 1006-1007 [2010]). Whether a jury verdict should be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence does not involve a question of law, but rather requires a discretionary balancing of many factors (see Cohen v
Applying these principles here, there was a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences by which the jury could have rationally reached its verdict on the basis of the evidence presented at trial, and a fair interpretation of the evidence supported the jury’s determination that the defendant was not negligent (see Loughren v County of Ulster, 75 AD3d 976 , 977 [2010]; Muniz v New York City Tr. Auth., 30 AD3d 388 , 389-390 [2006]).
We agree with the plaintiff that the Supreme Court erred in precluding her from introducing into evidence certain photographs (see People v Patterson, 93 NY2d 80 , 84 [1999]; People v Byrnes, 33 NY2d 343 , 347 [1974]). However, this error was harmless, as there is no indication that the evidence would have had a substantial influence on the result of the trial (see CPLR 2002; Parlante v Cavallero, 73 AD3d 1001 , 1003 [2010]; Milone v Milone, 266 AD2d 363 [1999]). Skelos, J.P., Leventhal, Belen and Roman, JJ., concur.
Cases cited
- Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, Inc. 45 NY2d 493 at 499 p. 646
- Szczerbiak v. Pilat 90 NY2d 553 at 556 p. 646
- Guclu v. 900 Eighth Avenue Condominium, LLC 81 AD3d 592 at 592 p. 646
- Lolik v. Big V Supermarkets, Inc. 86 NY2d 744 at 746 p. 646
- Chavanne v. BZL Cleaning Solution, Inc. 84 AD3d 852 at 853 p. 646
- Piazza v. Corporate Builders Group, Inc. 73 AD3d 1006 at 1006-1007 p. 646
- Nicastro v. Park 113 AD2d 129 at 133 p. 647
- Jean-Louis v. City of New York 86 AD3d 628 at 629 p. 647
- Loughren v. County of Ulster 75 AD3d 976 at 977 p. 647
- Muniz v. New York City Transit Authority 30 AD3d 388 at 389-390 p. 647
- People v. Patterson 93 NY2d 80 at 84 p. 647
- People v. Byrnes 33 NY2d 343 at 347 p. 647
- Parlante v. Cavallero 73 AD3d 1001 at 1003 p. 647