Majority
Headnote
On the 7th of April, 1846, the defendant entered into a contract, under seal, with H. So M., hy which he agreed to furnish them a sufficient quantity of wool to run their factory for one year, for the consideration of his commissions of three cents per yard on all cloths manufactured hy them; M. & H. agreeing to deliver to the defendant all cloths manufactured hy them during the year, to he delivered on every Saturday night; the defendant to have the entire control of the cloths, to have, or hold or sell, whenever or wherever he could get the best prices for the same; M. & H. agreeing that the cloths might be sold by some good auction house, for cash, and that all expenses attending sale, transportation, insurance, commissions, &e. should be deducted, and the balance paid over to M. & H. , The defendant also agreed to advance ten cents per yard on all the cloths manufactured, as fast as delivered. The expenses were declared to consist in the cost of the wool, transportation, commissions, and the advance of ten cents per yard, insurance, <fcc.; all of which M. So H. agreed to pay, or allow to be deducted out of the sale of the cloths. On the 13th of July, 1846, M. gave the defendant a chattel mortgage on a portion of the machinery and cloths, yarn, &c. in the factory, conditioned to pay him whatever losses might arise, or which he might sustain by or under the above contract; such losses, if any, to be paid to the defendant on demand. M. & H., being indebted to the plaintiffs, on the 10th of September, 1846, made and delivered to them a draft or order upon the defendant in these words: “ Sir, Pay to G. So 0. or order three hundred dollars out of the balance that will be due us from the salesThe order in question looks to a future expected balance to be due from the defendant to Hill-man &• Hinchcliff, and the acceptance is an agreement to pay out of such expected balance. If no such balance should ever be found to exist, most clearly no liability of the defendant could arise out of the acceptance. The acceptance, which must be taken with reference to the terms of the order, and in connection with it, is an agreement to pay the plaintiffs out of such balance, and of necessity is conditional—that is, an agreement to pay provided there should be a balance. The expression, “ after deducting the amount you have advanced us,” &c. taken in connection with the whole instrument, and the circumstances of the case, is to be understood with reference to the time when the balance should be struck or ascertained, and is to have the same effect as if the words had been “ after deducting the amount you will have advanced us.” This perhaps is not the strict grammatical construction, but it seems to me it is manifestly what the drawers and acceptor understood and intended.
The inquiry then arises, what balance the parties to the order had reference to, upon what account it was to arise, and when
In July previous to the date of the order, it appears the parties to the contract, the defendant and Hillman <fc Hinchcliff, apprehended the defendant might sustáin losses under the contract, and to secure him against them, Hillman & Hinchcliff
[Monroe General Term,
June 3, 1851.
Welles, Taylor and Johnson, Justices.]
This leads to the inquiry whether there was, at the close of the sales of the cloths received by the defendant, a balance due to Hillman & Carpenter, the latter having been substituted in the contract in the place of Hinchcliff.
The case shows that the total amount of receipts by the defendant, on sales of cloths received under the contract, was $7853,15. That the goods mortgaged were sold under the mortgage in May, 1847, and produced $1389,06. This, added to the last sum, amounts to $9242,21. The defendant’s account for wool, money advanced, commissions, &c. under the contract, without including the last item, Avhich is for a note against Mill-man & Hinchcliff, amounts to $9455,02—showing a balance of over $200 in his favor.
If the foregoing views are substantially correct, the contingency has never arisen upon which the defendant’s liability under his acceptance of the order depended, and consequently the report of the referee against him must be set aside, and a new trial ordered before the same referee, with costs to abide the event.