p. 169in conjunction with Mr. Bade, which he rather declined, but reiterated his promise and assurance that he would not press its collection; it might remain for some days ; and he did not wish to make any more specific arrangements in regard to it; he could only promise us that it should not be pressed; and I think, in one of my interviews with him, he intimated that he would not disturb us before his departure for Europe, which was fixed for something like a week hence. When it became evident that we must suspend business, I communicated to him the arrangements we had made in regard to this note; he refused to be bound by them, and, in subsequently liquidating the amount of our liabilities to him, this note was included, on the ground that we had arranged for its payment in a manner he refused to -be bound by; its payment had been extended without his consent. We also owe him as a firm ; and both of us did, in July last, individually owe him ; I owe him still-, and he has received no moneys, or security, or indemnity of any kind applicable to this note, or to other indebtedness.""
E. W. Stoughton, for the appellant.
A. F. Smith, for the plaintiff.
Did the plaintiff make siich an agreement with the principal to extend the time of payment, as to entitle the surety to a discharge from his liability1?
It is a rule,, too well settled to admit of dispute, now, that an extension of the time of payment for a single day, without the assent of the surety will exonerate him. But this extension of the credit must be founded on a consideration, and must be such an agreement as precludes the creditor from enforcing payment against the principal until the expiration of a specified period.
In this case, the evidence in relation to the alleged extension shows nothing like an agreement of this nature. There is nothing in it from which a sufficient consideration can even be inferred, or such a promise on the part of the plaintiff as would prevent Mm from commending an action against the principal at any
p. 170time after the note became due. The witness, Wattson,' says that when he called on the plaintiff, just before the note fell due, to request of him further time to pay it, the latter expressed his anxiety to close the sale of lands before he left for Europe, which lands Bade, the maker of the note, and the witness were employed by him as agents to sell; the witness then “ urged his own
willingness, though not bound to do so, to forward the sale of the lands to any emigrants that might arrive during the season, without any additional cost to the plaintiff. On these
assurances and considerations,- Mr. Draper (the plaintiff) agreed and promised not to press the collection of the note, nor to ask payment of it
for some days; he (the witness) wished him to fix some specific time for payment,” which the plaintiff rather declined. “
It might remain for some days.” The willingness of the witness to serve the plaintiff in another matter could not be deemed a legal consideration to support any agreement; and even if it were,, the promise was too indefinite and uncertain to debar the plaintiff from resorting to his legal remedy against the principal at any time after the note became payable by its terms. The promise, at most, was merely gratuitous, and imported no legal obligation whatever.
[New-York General Term,
June 1, 1854.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Mitchell, Roosevelt and Clerke, Justices.)