p. 193the time. The witness was asked, “Were you ever present at any meeting of the arbitrators, when testimony was taken as to the amount and value of grapes in the grapery ?” The counsel for the defendant objected to the question. The court sustained the objection, and excluded the testimony; to which decision the counsel for the plaintiff excepted. Question by counsel for the plaintiff: “Were you ever present at any meeting of the arbitrators at which any testimony was taken as to the amount of plants belonging to the parties respectively, or their value ?” The counsel for the defendant also objected to this question; the court sustained the objection, and the counsel for the plaintiff excepted. Question by the counsel for the plaintiff: “Was there ever evidence taken, or statement of the parties mutually assented to introduced, or personal inspection of the subject matter of the controversy had at any meeting of the arbitrators ?” The counsel for the defendant objected to the question ; the court sustained the objection and excluded the question, and the counsel for the plaintiff again excepted.
The court directed a verdict to be rendered for the defendant ; and the jury rendered a verdict accordingly.
Willard & Anderson, for the plaintiff.
I. The submission embraced only matters of account, and, therefore, did not include the present right of action. The admission of the award in evidence was error.II. The award bears date after the day on which it was required to be made, and there is no evidence that the parties waived this defect; the court, therefore, erred in admitting the award in evidence.III. Inasmuch as the submission was under seal, the award should have been under seal.IV. The awrard was not final, inasmuch- as there remained a duty to be performed by persons named by the arbitrators, in its nature judicial. ( Waite v. Barry, 12 Wend. 377 . Cockson v. Ogle, Lutw. 169. Kyd on Awards, 127.V. The court erred in excluding the evidence offered on the part of the plaintiff, the effect of which was to show that no arbi
p. 194tration had in fact taken place. (Peters v. Newkirk, 6 Cowen, 103. De Long v. Stanton, 9 John. 38 .)John G. Lamberson, for the defendant.
I. The objection that the submission related to matter of account only, was not well taken. (1.) The submission recites, “ that a controversy exists in relation to the settlement of the accounts between the parties and the claims of each upon the other.” This language can only be construed to intend a submission of all matters in difference between the parties. The rule of law being, that submissions are to be construed and expounded according to their signification in common parlance. Thus, a submission of all demands extends to real as well as personal property. (Munro v. Alaire, 2 Caines, 320. De Long v. Stanton, 9 John. 38 . Fidler v. Cooper, 19 Wend. 285 . Emmet v. Hoyt, 17 id. 410 .) The evidence and allegations introduced before the arbitrators, show conclusively that the subject matters of this action, and only those, were intended to be settled between the parties.II. The objections to the award were not well taken. (1.) It does not appear in any manner,- even by implication, that the award was not made up and ready for delivery within the time required by the submission. All that appears in relation to the matter is, that it was not called for until probably the 23d of September; that it had been ready to deliver on demand, and was in the hands of one of the arbitrators, who dated it and handed it to the plaintiff when demanded; thus all the requisites as to time were complied with. (Perkins v. Wing, 10 John. 143 .) (2.) The submission did not call for or require an award under seal; nor would a seal under any circumstances be of any force to give vitality to an award. (Stanton v. Henry, 11 John. 133 .) . (3.) The award is certain and final, in accordance with the whole line of decisions upon those points. ( 2 John. 57 . 13 id. 27. 5 Wend. 268 . 1 Caines, 304. 14 John. 96 .) An award referring to certain extrinsic circumstances is sufficiently certain. ( 5 Wend. 14 . 13 John. 27 .) Award is sufficient, if it leaves a ministerial act to be done or
p. 195calculation to be made. (Waite v. Barry, 12 Wend. 377 . Case v. Ferris, 2 Hill, 75 . 1 id. 489.) (4.) The award is a bar to the action. ( 11 John. 189 .)III. The questions propounded by the plaintiff’s counsel at the trial and overruled by the court, were incompetent and inadmissible. (1.) The witness being called by the plaintiff, and having testified directly upon the same points referred to by the questions, the questions were each and all in the nature of a cross-examination of his own witness. (2.) They were inadmissible as tending to impeach the award. The testimony of an arbitrator is inadmissible to impeach his award. ( 2 John. 399 . 17 id. 405 . 5 Cowen, 383.) An award made in good faith is conclusive. Neither party is permitted to prove that arbitrators decided wrong either as to law or fact. ( Winship v. Jewett, 1 Barb. Ch. 173 .)There is no sufficient objection to the award on which the judge directed the verdict for the defendant. The submission embraced the settlement not only of the accounts bétween the parties, but of all claims of each upon the other. The disputes between them at that time, as far as we can see, all grew out of their agreement in respect to'the green houses and the cultivation of the plants which are the subject of the present suit. From this resulted finally claims as to the ownership of the plants «fee., which might be regarded in different aspects, either as claims for accounts of the value or the proceeds of the property, or as a charge of a tortious conversion. It would be doing violence to the settled rules of construction in such cases, and to the benign and favorable interpretation of such instruments which the courts have always adopted, to hold that either kind of claims or demands, or a right of action which might be brought in either form, did not come within the terms of this submission.
There is no proof that either of the parties desired the award before the day of its date, or of any demand upon the arbitrators on the day set in the submission for making the award. There is no proof upon the subject, on either side, ex
p. 196cept that it was delivered when it was called for, and that it bears date on the 23d September, the day after the time set in the assignment for the award to be ready for either party who should demand it. ' This is not sufficient to show that the award was not ready on that day. When it was called for it was ready, and if this was not a literal compliance with the submission, it will at any rate be presumed, until the contrary is affirmatively shown, that the arbitrators performed their duty and had the award ready within the time set. The mere date at the end of the paper is not enough to establish the contrary.
¡Nor is there any objection to the finality of the award. It leaves nothing to be done to dispose of the whole matter in controversy except mere ministerial acts, and that has been repeatedly held no objection to an award. ( 12 Wend. 377 . 2 Hill, 75 .) It was claimed that because the submission was by a sealed instrument, the award must also be under seal; but this is not the rule. A seal is not requisite in such cases, unless the submission stipulates for that. Whatever forms are required by the terms of the submission must be observed, but there is no connection between the submission and the award that would make it necessary that one should be under seal because the other was.
The evidence offered, to impeach the award, was also rightly rejected. Even fraud or corruption cannot, according to the better opinion, be set up against an award, in an action at law. The party averring it must bring his suit or in some proper way assert his claim to have the award set aside. ( 5 Wend. 518 .) Certainly nothing else not appearing on the face of the award can be pleaded or proved against it. ( 12 Wend. 158 .)
And the evidence which the defendant offered, so far from proving corruption or partiality, would have shown, if any thing, that the particular matters referred to were not considered or examined or brought before the arbitrators at all. This is clearly immaterial. If the submission included these subjects it is of no consequence to the validity of the award that any particular subject to which it extended was not laid before the
p. 197arbitrators.
(Wheeler v.
Van Houten, 12
John. 311 .
Fidler v.
Cooper, 19
Wend. 285 .)
[Kings General Term,
October 14, 1856.
After a party has agreed to submit all his claims upon another to a domestic tribunal of their own choosing it would be exceedingly unjust to allow him to remove a portion of his demands and make them the matter of a subsequent suit. The only question is whether the demands were within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators. If the parties placed them there they must take the consequences if they do not invoke the exercise of all the powers of their umpires, or bring to their notice all the subjects which they are appointed to finally determine.
No errors were committed at the trial, and the motion for a new trial must be denied with costs.
Brown and Emott, Justices. Rockwell, J. died after the argument, and before the decison.]