Majority
Headnote
The plaintiffs, who were common carriers, brought to the city of New York, and had in their possession, 43 barrels of whisky belonging to P. and consigned to D. G. & Co. Subsequently, in delivering to the defendants a quantity of whisky, upon an order from H. T. & Co., the plaintiffs by mistake, delivered to them the 43 barrels belonging to P. On discovering the mistake, the plaintiffs demanded a return of the whisky, or payment of its value, which was refused. They then paid to D. G. & Co., as agents of P., the value of the property, and took their receipt, and again demanded the whisky, or payment, of the defendants, and on refusal, brought this action to recover the value of the whisky. D. being examined as a witness by the plaintiffs, L., one of the defendants, was offered as a witness for the defendants, under § 399 of the code.If this may be considered an action of tort, for the conversion of the whisky, I think that the referee was justified in finding for the plaintiffs. The possession of the property by the defendants, and their refusal or neglect to deliver it, after demand, were sufficiently proved.' The plaintiffs having been deprived, involuntarily, of the possession, no matter in what way, are, even as qualified owners, entitled to the restoration of the property, or to its value.
If, on the other hand, this may be considered an action for the value of the property, on an implied contract, the complaint and the evidence are sufficient to sustain it. The plaintiffs, on the 2d of February, 1854, became the_purchasers of the whisky from the consignees, and afterwards demanded the return of it, or payment for it. three or four times. As the absolute own
[New York General Term,
November 2, 1857.
It is plain that the plaintiffs cannot be deemed the assignees of a thing in action. Their claim can only be sustained, as I have intimated, on the ground that they were either the qualified or absolute owners of tangible personal property. The defendant Lounsberry, therefore, had no right to be examined as a witness, under ■§ 399 of the code. The subject of the controversy was not a thing in action, and Mr. Dows, consequently, was not examined as an assignor of a thing in action, but as the agent of the parties, who had sold the property to the plaintiffs.
Judgment affirmed with costs.
Mitchell, Clerke and Pear-body, Justices.]