Majority
Headnote
Where a promissory note was shown to have been in the possession of, and owned by, the payee within four or five days of his death, and there was no evidence of any transfer thereof by him, in his lifetime, but about two weeks after his death his widow was in possession of it, claiming it as her own, and she subsequently negotiated it to the plaintiff; and it appeared that the payee died intestate and indebted, and no letters of administration had been issued : Meld that it was to be inferred, from these circumstances; that the note belonged to the payee, at the time of his death, and that his widow not being his legal representative, nor the owner of the note, had no right to transfer the same to the plaintiff. Wright, P. J., dissented.The report of the referee leaves it uncertain what was the latest date at which Carroll was in possession of the note; but it is apparent from the testimony that it must have been within a few days of his death. No transfer of the note by him is shown. The evidence fails to show satisfactorily even an attempted gift; although the widow stated to the plaintiff that her husband had given her the note. But the fact of the gift is not expressly sworn to ; the manner of it is not shown; nor does it appear that any delivery ever
Mor are the payments to the plaintiff himself an estoppel upon the defendant. They are strong evidence of a supposed legal liability, but not a conclusive bar. He may have been ignorant of the facts; he may not have hád time to inquire; and the amount of the payment may have been so small as to be a matter of indifference whethér it was legally collectable or not. There is no just reason for compelling a party to pay the residue of an unjust demand, simply because he has paid a portion of it without objection. The whole doctrine of estoppel rests upon this foundation, that a party has refused to speak when he ought to have done so, and has omitted to make known important facts, the knowledge of which would have induced a different course of action, from what would have taken place if all the facts had been disclosed. Although the doctrine of estoppel is not always carefully expressed, the cases all go upon the assumption that the party. estopped is guilty of a false statement, or of a concealment of material facts, at a time when he has an opportunity and is
[Albany General Term,
September 6, 1858.
Wright, Gould and Hogeboom, Justices.]
The judgment should he reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
Gould, J., concurred.
Wright, P. J. dissented.
Judgment reversed.
Cases cited
- Edwards v. Campbell 23 Barb. 423 p. 47
- Woodin v. Bagley 13 Wend. 453 p. 47
- Martin v. Angell 7 Barb. 407 p. 47
- Welland Canal Co. v. Hathaway 8 Wend. 480 p. 49
- Lowry v. Tew 3 Barb. Ch. 407 p. 49
- Outwater v. Dodge 6 Wend. 397 p. 49
- Tylee v. Yates 3 Barb. 222 p. 49
- Petrie v. Feeter 21 Wend. 172 p. 49
- Truscott v. Davis 4 Barb. 495 p. 49